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NOTE
At the time to submission of this paper, both committee
processes were still underway. Because both processes are
changing so quickly, and because the conclusions in this
paper are not based on interviews with all of the committee
members, this paper is not intended for wide distribution.
In addition, at the time of submission, this paper had
been reviewed by David Straus, facilitator for the Downtown
Area Plan Committee. Straus's comments on the paper are
briefly outlined in the Appendix.
The author looks forward to the products of both
committees, and hopes that both committees will achieve
successful results.
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ABSTRACT
Mediated negotiation emphasizes the presence of a neutral
intervenor in formal processes involving multiple parties.
Proponents of mediated negotiation argue that it is
particularly adaptable to public sector disputes because it
promotes communication and information sharing, results in
durable, workable agreements which are more likely to be
accepted by the parties, and increases the legitimacy of the
agreement in the eyes of the broader public.
Under its new mayor, Federico Penfa, the city of Denver,
Colorado has been experimenting with various forms of
mediated negotiation to make land use decisions. This thesis
studies the processes of two such experiments: the Downtown
Area Plan Committee (DAPC), formed to develop a land use plan
for downtown Denver, and the Platte Valley Development
Committee (PVDC) convened to create a land use plan for
Denver's Platte River Valley.
Analysis of the successes and failures of the two committees
as of April 30, 1985 indicates that mediated negotiation has
a better chance for success when six conditions exist: 1)
public officials have the political strength to gather
support for nonconventional decisionmaking, 2) the parties to
the negotiation have clear incentives to negotiate, 3) third
party facilitators have special expertise about the issues to
be negotiated, are familiar to the parties and the community,
and maintain a neutral position with respect to the parties,
4) the negotiation involves specific, finite issues, and 5)
the parties have a clear understanding about how the
agreement will fit back into traditional legal channels for
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence Susskind, Professor of Urban
Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
By their nature, land use decisions involve multiple
parties with competing interests. An optimal building density
from a real estate developer's point of view may cause concern
among neighborhood residents interested in reducing noise and
traffic and maintaining land values. A building density
agreeable to neighborhood groups may not provide the developer
with an adequate return on his investment. A solution that
satisfies both the developer and the neighborhood residents
may conflict with environmental groups concerned with
groundwater or air pollution. The public governing body
concerned with enhancing revenues may want to impose costs on
the developer to compensate for the demands which his
development has created for infrastructure and increased city
services.
Traditionally, competing parties have resolved such
controversies through three mechanisms: 1) administrative
bodies, including planning and zoning boards, 2) legislative
processes, including lobbying and voting, and 3) litigation,
resulting in out of court settlements or court imposed
1
solutions. But such methods have severe limitations.
Administrative bodies provide no guarantees that opinions
expressed in public hearings will be reflected in final
decisions, and often lack the technical expertise to make
4
sound decisions. Lobbying requires groups with financial
resources and political know how, while voting results in a
yes or no decision when the issue involves a broader range of
choices. Court action tends to focus on procedure over
substance, precludes direct participation by the parties,
discourages information sharing and joint problem solving,
polarizes the parties, and costs money and time. Court
imposed sanctions are particularly inefficient when the
2
dispute involves more than two parties.
Recognizing the limitations of these conventional
methods, public officials, city planners, and students of
conflict resolution have been developing new techniques for
involving multiple parties in complex land use decisions.
Generally, such techniques are more successful than
conventional methods because they allow direct involvement by
the parties to the dispute, produce settlements more rapidly
and at lower cost than the courts can produce, and can be
adapted to the particular needs of the parties and the larger
public.
One such technique, mediated negotiation, emphasizes the
presence of a neutral intervenor in a formal processes
4
involving multiple parties. Proponents of this alternative
argue that mediated negotiation is particularly adaptable to
public sector disputes because it promotes communication and
information sharing, results in durable, workable agreements
which are more likely to be accepted by the parties, and
increases the legitimacy of the agreement in the eyes of the
5
broader public. Mediated negotiation has been employed in
public sector disputes ranging from the distribution of
federal block grant funds in Connecticut, resolving water
policy in Colorado, and funding a state employment
6
compensation fund in Wisconsin.
Under its new mayor, Federico Pefta., the city of Denver,
Colorado has been experimenting with forms of mediated
negotiation in land use decisionmaking. During his first two
years in office, PeNa has organized six committees or task
forces to develop recommendations about particular land use
issues in Denver. Two of these committees, the Downtown Area
Plan Committee (DAPC), and the Platte Valley Development
Committee (PVDC), are particularly novel because they
attempted to include representatives. from all the
stakeholding interests, were instructed to develop
recommendations for large land areas rather than more
restricted sites, and employed professional facilitators.
These two committees are the subject of this thesis.
Evaluating the work of these committees first requires
assumptions about the components of a successful negotiation.
In general, proponents of mediated negotiation have
established five criteria. First, the negotiation should
produce an efficient agreement--one that maximizes the gains
of all the parties. Second, the agreement should minimize the
expenditure of time and money in reaching the agreement.
Third, the agreement should appear fair to the parties and to
the broader community. Fourth, the agreement should be
implementable. Fifth, the process should improve, or at least
7
not damage the relationships among the parties.
Analysis of the two committees with respect to those
five criteria indicates that mediated negotiation works
better in some cases than in others. Specifically, cities
who use mediated negotiation should insure that five
conditions exist: 1) public officials have the political
strength to gather support for nontraditional decisionmaking,
2) the parties to the negotiation have clear incentives to
negotiate, 3) third party facilitators have special
expertise about the issues to be negotiated, are familiar to
the parties and the community, and maintain a neutral
position with respect to the parties in thehe negotiation, 4)
the negotiation involves specific, finite issues, and 5) the
City and the parties to the negotiation have a clear
understanding about how the agreement will fit back into
traditional legal channels for implementation, monitoring,
and enforcement. The more of these conditions that are
absent, the more cities should consider leaving land use
decisions to conventional administrative, legislative, and
judicial decisionmaking.
This thesis contains four sections. Section I describes
Denver's recent planning and real estate development history,
and discusses the changes in planning which Mayor PeNa
implemented during his first two years in office. Section II
describes the organization and activities of the Downtown Area
Plan Committee and the Platte Valley Development Committee.
Section III analyzes the work of the committees to date, using
information gained from committee members, staff, and
7
facilitators involved. Section IV discusses lessons which can
be learned from the two committee processes, and explains the
six conditions which promote successful mediated negotiations.
At the time of writing, both committee processes were
still underway. This analysis is limited, therefore, to an
evaluation of the interim products of the committees as of
April 3 , 1985. Since that date, several changes in the
committee processes may have occurred, requiring
modifications in the conclusions of this thesis.
SECTION I: Denver: 1970 - 1985
A. The McNichols Administration
1. Real Estate Development: Boom and Bust
Before the 1970's, Denver, Colorado lived up to its
reputation as a sleepy western cowtown. While the city served
as the government, communications, and financial center for
the Rocky Mountain region, it still preserved a provincial
atmosphere. Virtually untouched by real estate speculators,
downtown Denver had only three skyscrapers; the largest was
the 20-story clock tower of the 1900 Daniels and Fisher
1
department store.
In part, Urban Renewal set the stage for the massive
growth which occurred in downtown Denver in the 1970's and
1980's. Created in 1958, the Denver Urban Renewal Authority
(DURA) chose as one of its five projects a 27 block area in
lower downtown Denver. Under this project, called Skyline,
DURA spent $33 million clearing dilapidated commercial
buildings, bars, missions, and pawn shops in lower downtown.
The land lay vacant for several years, but it provided a
welcome invitation to developers eager to cash in on Denver's
2
boom in the 1970's.
The 1973 Arab Oil embargo enhanced the attractiveness of
hard-to-get domestic energy resources in the Rocky Mountains.
The eight state region holds 90% of the nation's total uranium
supplies, 70% of oil shale reserves, and 40% of coal supplies,
as well as immense reserves of natural gas and other metals.
9
Not surprisingly, Denver became the region's hub for
exploration activity. Some 1700 energy related companies,
including equipment suppliers, subcontractors, computer firms,
and service industries like law and banking had opened offices
in Denver by 1980. The population in the eight state region
grew 28% from 1970 to 1980, the highest percentage growth in
4
the country. Employment growth during the same period
5
averaged 5.5% per year.
These newcomers needed office space, and developers from
throughout the United States and Canada responded eagerly.
From 1979 to 198., the amount of office space in Denver
doubled--from 25 million square feet in 1979 to 54 million
square feet in 1983. In 1981 alone, the office market
expanded at a rate of more than two times the national average
of 8.2!%. In that year, Denver added 7.2 million square feet
of office space, with the downtown area accounting for two
6
million square feet of the total.
Canadian developers invested heavily in Denver. The city
offered a public eager for growth, and an environment free
from Canadian economic and political constraints. By 1981,
more than 24 Canadian investment and development companies
were active in the Denver area and they owned 3000 acres of
choice Denver real estate. They had already built seven new
7
office towers, and eight more were underway. Land prices
soared. One Canadian company paid $400/square foot for land
in downtown Denver's "Silver Triangle," traditionally worth
8
$65/square foot.
10
By 1982, however, Denver began to feel the effects of a
downturn in the national energy market. Falling oil prices,
escalating costs, high interest rates, and competition from
foreign markets reduced demand for new domestic oil and gas
sources, and caused cutbacks in the production of minerals
9
like uranium, copper, molybdenum, silver, and zinc. Oil and
mineral companies responded by cutting work forces, closing
10
regional offices and reducing spending. In early 1982, for
example, Climax Molybdenum announced that it was laying off
2600 workers, and on May 2 of that year, Exxon USA announced
that it was pulling out of its huge Colony Shale Oil project
11
on Colorado's western slope.
As the energy slump dominoed into energy service and
equipment companies, real estate developers responded by
curtailing building plans. In late spring, 1982, Canterra
Petroleum, Inc., a Calgary-based oil firm, abandoned plans to
build a $20 million, 29-story office and retail complex in
downtown Denver, citing "low oil and gas prices and unsettled
12
economic conditions in both the U.S. and Canada." Soon
after, Reliance Development Company announced postponement of
another large downtown project until the office vacancy rate
13
in Denver decreased. Many oil companies began to sublease
their excess space, and Denver's office market swung in favor
of tenants who could command rents as low as $10 per square
foot including concessions. By mid 1984, Denver's office
14
vacancy rate stood at 21"4, topped only by Houston, Texas.
2. Responses from the City Planning Office
While the city's minimal controls over real estate
11.
development before 1982 contributed to Denver's boom, they
also aggravated the problems of a depressed market. Mayor
William McNichols, Denver's mayor from 1968 to 1982, welcomed
development as a way to expand the city's tax base and create
new jobs. He had little interest in design and development
review or long-range planning, fearing that such controls
would discourage developers from coming to Denver.
Representative of his limited belief in planning, McNichols
cut the budget of the city planning office from $1.2 million
to $700,000 in 1982, laying off 16 of the city's 39 planners.
Planning office responsibilities by that time were limited to
"collecting data, dispensing information, and answering
15
requests."
McNichols also failed to push for modifications in the
city's outdated comprehensive plan and zoning code to reflect
current development patterns in Denver. The only downtown
height restrictions are those imposed by a mountain view
ordinance, and by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Maximum density allowances under the city's outdated zoning
code are far greater than most developers will risk
16
building. As a result, the city has little leverage over
developers, since they seldom need variances or other city
approvals for their building plans. During the building boom,
the city lost several opportunities to require developers to
provide urban design amenities or mitigate negative impacts of
their developments.
Other planning functions were scattered among various
1.2
independent agencies, including the Zoning Administration, the
Community Development Agency, the Denver Housing Authority,
and the Denver Urban Renewal Authority. The agencies
interacted infrequently, and there was no mechanism for
pooling resources, developing joint goals and policies, or
coordinating activities. A 1972 management study of the City
of Denver commented,
The necessary coordination among the many
interested agencies and services concerned with the
matters of housing and physical development is not
effectively accomplished because of the
fragmentation of responsibilities... Finally, there
is no organizational mechanism or single point or
responsibility for the development of a unified
comprehensive housing and physical development
program with equal authority to insure its
implementation.17
3. The Denver Partnership
Virtually any planning that did occur in downtown Denver
during the McNichols Administration resulted from the efforts
of a private organization, The Denver Partnership. The
Partnership grew out of a downtown merchants association
created in 1955 to deal with issues like street lighting,
traffic, and trash removal. It was reorganized in 1980,
under Richard Fleming, a former HUD Deputy Assistant
Secretary. With a membership of 500 downtown business people
and property owners, the Partnership consists of two
subsidiaries. Downtown Denver, Inc., the downtown promotion
organization, has a $1 million budget raised from membership
dues and income from its operation of the 16th Street mall
maintenance district. Denver Civic Ventures, the nonprofit
research and design arm, derives its funds solely from grants
13~.
18
and contributions.
McNichols deferred to the Partnership on most planning
issues involving downtown. With that mandate, the
Partnership achieved significant accomplishments during the
late 1970's and early 1980's. First, it sponsored
negotiations between the Urban Mass Transit Authority (UMTA),
the Regional Transportation District (RTD), and the City,
which led to the construction of Denver's new 16th Street
transit mall. Designed by I.M. Pei & Partners, the mall cost
$72 million, and now includes two bus terminals and specially
designed shuttle buses. The Partnership also commissioned a
study on a proposed taxing district for the mall. After
complaints that the district was too narrowly based, Fleming
convinced the city to expand the taxing district and let the
Partnership manage the district. The mall maintenance
district now operates smoothly, and few would disagree that
the mall has dramatically improved downtown's
19
attractiveness.
Second, the Partnership promoted several changes in
downtown zoning. It commissioned studies for, and achieved
passage of a "sunlight ordinance" for the 16th Street Mall.
As an overlay to the existing B-5 zoning on the mall, the
ordinance gives height bonuses to builders who include upper
level setbacks and ground level retail space in their
projects. In addition, the Partnership catalyzed the passage
of a transferable development rights (TDR) ordinance in
Denver, which increases densities on new buildings in
exchange for revitalizing historic structures in the same
14
zone. Finally, it rewrote the lower downtown B-7 zoning
ordinance to provide for TDR's and for density bonuses for
20
developers who build housing.
Third, the Partnership involved itself in several issues
outside of downtown. During 1982 and 1983, it provided
technical assistance, consultants, and management for a
convention center task force, composed of business people and
the city council, to study locations for a new convention
center. As downtown's neighborhood organization,
Partnership also joined in a coalition with
neighborhood groups to study the impact of expansion
nearby Cherry Creek shopping center. (map, p.2
Partnership and Cherry Creek developers have lo,
competing to bring a major retail project to
Recognizing that the city can support only one such
the Partnership believes that locating the project in
Creek would severly undermine their efforts to at
major retailer, and thus, shoppers, to downtown.
interest of promoting downtown retail, the Par
other
of the
5) The
ng been
Denver.
project,
Cherry
tract a
In the
tnership
provided staff, project management, and funding for the
21
Cherry Creek coalition.
Finally, the Partnership commissioned a major study on
Denver housing, and has been providing housing seminars and
technical assistance for packaging downtown housing
22
projects.
4. Broader Economic Issues
While the Partnership made significant contributions to
1.5
The
downtown revitalization, however, its efforts have produced
only piecemeal solutions to larger scale problems.
McNichols's laissez faire attitude promoted a city of shiny
new buildings with few urban design amenities. New York
Times architecture critic Paul Goldberger describes downtown
as a "disappointing collection of mediocre skyscrapers."
Most downtown night life is limited to Larimer Square, a one-
block area of restored historic buildings; the rest of
downtown goes dark after six o'clock.
Efforts to promote downtown housing have also failed.
Because downtown land prices are so high, developers can only
afford to build luxury housing. Homebuyers in that price
range, however, have many attractive alternatives to
downtown, and downtown does not offer them enough amenities
to forego those alternatives. As a result, the average
absorption rate in downtown is less than one home per month
per project, and few developers have been able to build homes
24
at affordable prices.
The city as a whole suffers from more serious problems.
The "Poundstone Amendment", passed in 1974 by the State
Legislature, prevents the city from annexing adjacent
suburbs, so Denver's population has hovered around 500,000
for the past ten years. Meanwhile, the city is forced to
provide services for an increasingly needy population. While
Denver's overall population declined 4% from 1970 to 1980,
the number of households increased by 14%, and the elderly
population increased 2.5%, to 17% of the total population.
(Table 1) The median household income grew 1% in the six
16
county region, but Denver's median income declined 5%. 
capita income increased 30% in the region, but only 23% in
Denver. (Table 2) Finally, total employment increased 65% in
the region,
25
increase.
but Denver itself only recognized a
(Table 3)
15%
TABLE 1
Pgpuation3 Denver vs. Six County Region: 1970 - 190
Six,- County Region Denver. County
1290
Total 1,618,461
Households 608,402
Elderly
60 - 69
70 - 79
80 & over
TOTAL
98,630
55,259
27,357
181,746
1970 %Change
1,235,927 31%
394,497 54%
73,036 35%
44,053 25
19,788 41%
136,877
1980 12Z Changee
492,365 514,678 -4%
211,566 185,497 14%
41,388
27,939
14,564
42,155
27,654
12,068
-2%
1%
21%
83,891 81,877 2.5%
% of
Population 11% 11% 17% 16%
TABLE 2
Household Incgmes Denver vs. SiX County Region 1970 - 1980
(000's)
Six County Regi on
1970 % Change
Denver County
1980 1970 % Change
under $15K< 219
$15K - $29.9K 233
$30K - $49.9K 119
$50K - $74.9K
$75K or more
26
12
146
162
68
50%
44%
75%
10 150%
9 34%
Median Household
Income
Per Capita
Income
19.9
8.9
19.7
6.8
1%
103
72
86
66
28 25
6 4
4
15.5 16.4
8.5 6.9
17
1980
18%
9%
10%
70%
22%
- 5%
Per
----------------------------------------------
TABLE 3
EEgment, Denver vs. Six County Region: 1970 - 1980
(000's)
Six County Region Denver County
1980 1970 % Change 1980 1970 %Change
Civilian
Labor
Force 854 515 66% 258 222 16%
Employed 819 496 65% 245 213 15%
Unemployed 36 19 87% 13 9 41%
Civilian
Unemployment
Rate 4.1 3.7 5.0 4.1
The City's financial position has also weakened
significantly in the past ten years. Changes in Denver's
economy, combined with legislative actions, have changed the
relative contributions of Denver's two major sources of
revenue--sales and property taxes.
From 1974 to 1984, Denver's property tax revenues
declined from 23% to 16% of Denver's total revenues, due, in
large part, to state legislative actions exempting large
portions of the potential property tax base from taxation.
In real 1967 dollars, property tax revenues declined from $21
million in 1974 to $15 million in 1984. (Table 4) All other
sources of revenue except sales tax also declined during that
period.
Sales tax revenues increased from 27% to nearly 50% of
total revenues from 1974 to 1984. (Table 4) Although sales
tax revenues grew in both real and nominal terms, that growth
18C
was insufficient to make up for the decline in property tax
revenues. As a result, per capita expenditures in 1967 real
dollars declined from $198 million in 1975 to $177 million in
26
1983.
TABLE 4
Revenues from Sales and Fr onerty Taxes
Denver- g Colorado, 1974 - 1984
(000' )
1974 1984
Nominal 1967 Nominal 1967
Doll1.ars Doll1.ars %Total Dollars Dollars %/Total
Sales
Taes 3 5.2 25.4 26% 145.2 42.4 48%
Property
Taxes 30.9 22.3 227. 50.2 14.7 16"A
This decline in revenues resulted in transfers from the
City's Capital Improvements Fund to the General Fund and a
corresponding depletion of the General Fund balance from $30
million in the late 1970's to $6 million in 1985. As a
result, investment in the city's capital stock is inadequate,
and the city's excellent bond ratings are threatened.
Meanwhile, the city could lose some $12.4 million, four
percent of its $320 million operating budget in 1985, if the
27
federal government eliminates revenue sharing.
B. The Pefta Administration
1. Pefta's Election
Federico Peha was elected mayor on June 21, 1983.
Incumbent McNichols had been defeated in the primary, and
Peha beat his challenger, former District Attorney Dale
19
fewer than
The 37
t Hispanic
y unknown
4500 votes out of the record 155,000
year old former state legislator is
28
mayor.
a year before election day, Pefa
secured his
supporters,
environmenta
cultivating
Campaign wo
and t-shirts
right chord
administrati
opponents by
but also a 1
future. He
neighborhood
bringing
election by building a broad coalition of
including Hispanics, gays, women,
lists, and young white professionals, while also
29
the support of prominent business leaders.
rkers covered the city with yard signs, buttons,
. His "Imagine a Great City" slogan struck the
with Denver voters weary of a lackluster city
on. PeNa distinguished himself from his
stressing that Denver needed not only a manager,
eader who could shape the direction of the city's
took strong stands on issues ranging from
planning, anti-discrimination for gays, and
30
major league baseball
A major part
to Denver.
of Pea's platform was his promise to
strengthen the city's planning functions. He recognized that
developers had virtually controlled planning decisions in
Denver, and that McNichols had abrogated much of his power to
private organizations like the Denver Partnership. Denver's
decentralized planning activities, outdated comprehensive
plan, and obsolete zoning code, he pointed out, exemplified
31
McNichols's failure to fulfill important planning duties.
Besides supporting a strong planning office, Pefta
believed that effective planning and land use decisions
Tooley,
votes
Denver'
Vi
by
cast.
s firs
rtual 1
required participation by all stakeholders in such decisions.
Too many such decisions had failed in Denver, he recognized,
because major stakeholders had been excluded from the
processes. Some such decisions had failed because they
lacked necessary support for implementation. For example,
the Regional Transportation District (RTD) developed a light
rail proposal in 1977 without input from neighborhood groups.
When it came time for voters to approve a sales tax increase
to finance the system, RTD was unable to muster the necessary
votes. Other decisions failed because they produced
undesireable results. Without input from the City, urban
designers, or historic preservationists, for example, private
developers had redeveloped much of downtown void of
attractive public amenities, and had torn down several
historically significant buildings which could have preserved
3 2
downtown's historic flavor.
Although Pea wanted more people to have a voice in
development decisions, he did not want that participation to
follow traditional methods. In Denver, the City Council
defers to its "courtesy zoning" rule when making decisions on
rezoning requests: the members agree that they will abide by
the recommendations of the council member in whose district
the property under consideration lies. Under this system, an
interested party's influence on a rezoning request depends on
his ability to persuade the appropriate city council member.
Since council members listen first to their own constituents,
people who live outside a particular council district have
little participation in zoning questions within that
21
district. For areas like the Platte River Valley (map,
p.25) , courtesy zoning would disenfranchise large numbers of
people who would be affected by a rezoning of the Valley but
do not happen to live in the same council district in which
the Valley is located.
2. Changes in the Planning Office
During his first year in office, Pefta moved to implement
his planning ideas. His appointment of former Boulder city
planner, Bill Lamont, as his new planning director won
praise. The press viewed Lamont as enthusiastic, dedicated,
and capable of dealing with the myriad interest groups
33
involved in Denver planning. Pefta and Lamont immediately
set to work strengthening the responsibilities of the city
planning office. Zoning, community development, and economic
development were consolidated under the umbrella of the new
Office of Planning and Development. Lamont improved
communications between the Planning Office and independent
authorities like the Denver Urban Renewal Authority and the
34
Denver Housing Authority. The planning office budget
35
increased from $825,800 in 1982, to $1,211,500 in 1984.
Lamont also began to revise the outdated 1978
Comprehensive Plan. The revised plan will have three
sections. Section 1 will contain an overview, mission
statement, key concepts, and new goals and policies. Section
2 will contain plans for "functional" areas including land
use, urban design, transportation, housing, open space,
education, water and environmental quality, historic
preservation, and government; special plans for specific
locations in Denver; and an implementation section. Section
3 will contain specific neighborhood plans developed within
and by the neighborhoods. The Planning Office expects to
36
obtain review and adoption of the plan by January, 1986.
C. Citizen Participnation
Peha also began to formalize his ideas about citizen
participation. Several important development issues in
Denver, in various stages of discussion and planning under
McNichols, demanded immediate attention. During his first
nine months in office, Peha appointed six committees. The
Cherry Creek Steering Committee was charged with developing a
neighborhood plan for the Cherry Creek area, including
recommendations to the mayor on the expansion of Cherry Creek
shopping center. The Civic Center Task Force was responsible
for designing an urban design plan for the Civic Center area,
which encompasses the State Capitol, the City and County
Building, and a large park which connects them. The
Convention Center Task Force was charged with the most
politically volatile issue: recommending the location for
Denver's new convention center. The DCPA Task Force, an ad
hoc committee convened by the Mayor, the Partnership, and the
Denver Center for the Performing Arts (DCPA), was to meet
periodically to develop a redevelopment proposal for the
DCPA. The Platte Valley Development Committee replaced a
similar committee under McNichols working to develop a
comprehensive plan and rezoning recommendations for a 500
acre, industrially zoned parcel of land bordering downtown.
Finally, the Downtown Area Plan Committee sprung from
previous plans of the Denver Partnership to develop a
-37
comprehensive plan for downtown Denver. (map, next page)
The last two committees, the Platte Valley Development
Committee and the Downtown Area Plan Committee, are the
subjects of this analysis.
24
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SECTION II: Case Studies of Two Committees
A. Introduction
The experiences of the Downtown Area Plan Committee
(DAPC) and the Platte Valley Development Committee (PVDC),
while not necessarily characteristic of all the committees,
provide interesting lessons about public involvement in large
scale land use decisionmaking. The two committees are
special for three reasons. First, they are responsible for
decisions involving large areas; most of the other committees
deal with more restricted sites. Second, because the
committees' responsibilities are so immense, the City paid
greater attention to process considerations, and used
professional facilitators
For the same reason,
representatives from all
B. The Convention Center
This paper does not
Force at length, becausE
members, the City, and
in heated negotiations.
to manage parts of both processes.
the City attempted to involve
of the stakeholders in the decision.
Debate
discuss the Convention Center Task
at the time of writing, task force
the City Council were still involved
Nevertheless, it is important to
understand the history of the convention center debate,
its relationship to the decisions of both the Downtown Area
Plan Committee and the Platte Valley Development Committee.
In 1980, consultants recommended that Denver triple the
size of its Currigan Exhibition Hall so that Denver could
attract more convention business. In August, 1981, five
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railroads that own Union Station in lower downtown invited
redevelopment proposals for the station. They chose SOCMA
Corporation of Argentina and Realities, Inc. of Denver to
turn the station into a convention center, and transform
Currigan into a retail and office complex. A convention
center task force, appointed by McNichols, recommended that
the City Council accept the SOCMA plan in January, 1983.
After six months of heated negotiations with the City, City
Council, and the task force, however, SOCMA withdrew its
plan. The City wanted to place a higher value on Currigan
than SOCMA was willing to accept, and there was skepticism
about the developer's financial strength and commitment to
1
the project.
In November, 1983, Peha appointed a new task force,
comprised of two City Council members, two city officials,
and two members of the business community, to determine how
the City could develop its own convention center. A
consultant to the task force recommended three possible
sites: Currigan, the Denver Union Terminal (DUT) or Union
Station, and the Golden Triangle near the City and County
Building. (map, next page) The Union Station site was owned
by the Denver Union Terminal Railway Company (DUT), a
consortium of six railroads; and Glacier Park, the
development arm of Burlington Northern, Inc. Glacier Park
and developers Miller-Klutznik-Davis-Gray (MKDG) had
previously formed a joint venture, Mile High Land Associates,
to develop 155 acres of land adjacent to Union Station.
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Peha asked the three landowners to submit offers to sell
their land. In November, 1984, the task force endorsed the
Currigan site. The bid for the sale of Union Station,
submitted by Glacier Park and MKDG, was actually the lowest,
but contained an unacceptable condition. In exchange for the
cost of relocating Burlington Northern's mainline tracks and
its Trailer on Flat Car facility, the bidders had conditioned
their offer on approval of the rezoning of Mile High's 155
acres.
Peha had openly supported the Union Station site since
his election. When he received the task force's
recommendation, he announced that all of the bids were too
expensive or contained unacceptable conditions, and requested
all three landowners to improve their offers and resubmit
bids. His action angered some members of the City Council who
had supported the Currigan site, and the press criticized him
for circumventing the process which he had designed.
In January, 1985, the Currigan and Golden Triangle
landowners each submitted lower bids, while DUT and MKDG
submitted the same bid absent the rezoning condition. After
several days of intense lobbying, the City Council voted
seven to five, with one abstention, in favor of Union
Station. By May, 1985, City Council had approved a
financing concept and voted to accept a contract negotiated
for the purchase of the site.
Members of both committees took extreme interest in the
convention center site selection. Not only would the
decision affect urban design plans for both downtown and the
Platte Valley, but some committee members had financial
interests in particular sites. One DAPC member owned a
development company which had joined in the Golden Triangle
site proposal. Mile High Land Associates' actions on the
PVDC were directly link.ed to the Convention Center decision.
The Convention Center issue had a major impact on the
activities of both committees.
C. The Downtown Area Plan Committee
1. Background
Prior to Peha's election, the Denver Partnership
recognized that its work in downtown Denver had been
piecemeal. In response, Partnership staff began to formalize
plans for the creation of a Downtown Plan, to develop
comprehensive goals for future development in downtown.
After Peha's election, Partnership director Dick Fleming
realized that the Partnership could not develop the plan
without support from the City. He was able to convince PeNa
and Lamont to take advantage of the Partnership's efforts by
creating a Downtown Plan committee jointly managed by the
4
City and the Partnership.
2. Representation
The City and the Partnership agreed that the committee
members should include representatives from those
stakeholders who had an interest in and ability to block the
implementation of a downtown plan. Jointly, they developed a
list of fifteen different interest groups, and decided on
varying numbers of members from each group, depending on
their perception of the relative importance of each group.
The original list included:
1. Auraria Higher Education Center, 1 member
2. The City, 2 members
3. The Denver Planning Board, 1 member
4. The City Council, 4 members
5. Interneighborhood Cooperation, a citywide coalition
of neighborhood organizations, 1 member
6. The Neighborhood Partnership, a citywide coalition
of neighborhood development organizations, 1 member
7. Downtown Denver Residents Organization, 1 member
8. Denver Civic Ventures (The Denver Partnership), 2
members
9. Downtown Denver, Inc. (The Denver Partnership)., 5
members
10. Regional Transportation District (RTD), 1 member
11. Lower Downtown Property Owners, 1 member
12. Historic Preservation, 1 member
13. Newspapers, 2 members
14. State of Colorado, 1 member
15. Citizens at Large, 2 members
16. Denver Commission on Community Relations, 1 member
The Partnership and the City also copsidered including
representatives from professional organizations including the
American Institute of Architects (AIA) and the American
Society of Landscape Architects (ASLA). They decided against
including them, though, primarily because they were concerned
6
about the already large size of the the committee.
To identify representatives from most of the
organizations, the City and the Partnership notified the
organizations and asked them to select representatives for
the DAPC. In some cases, the City and the Partnership asked
specific individuals to sit on the committee. Because the
Partnership had seven representatives on the committee
(Denver Civic Ventures, and Downtown Denver, Inc.), it
controlled a significant portion of the total membership.
3. Funding, Staff, and Timeline
3 1
The City and the Partnership agreed that they would both
provide $500,000 in staff salaries and technical assistance
for the committee. The City also agreed to contribute
$100,000 from its Capital Improvements Program Budget, while
the Partnership agreed to contribute $250,000 - $750,000,
which it hoped to raise from foundation grants. As of 1985,
1 year later, the Partnership had contributed about $100,000,
and the City had contributed less staff support than
7
promised.
Because they recognized that the DAPC would not be
preparing a traditional plan, the City and the Partnership
also agreed to hire a facilitator for the committee. At the
Partnership's suggestion, they chose David Straus, of
Interaction Associates, a San Francisco and Boston based
organization which concentrates primarily on private sector
dispute resolution. Fleming had met Straus through the
International Downtown Executive Association (IDEA)., and had
been impressed his work in cities like Newark, New Jersey,
8
and Hartford, Connecticut.
The DAPC's timeline was partly determined by outside
pressures. The Partnership stressed that foundations who
were funding the committee wanted to see some product within
9
one year. The City and the Partnership agreed, therefore,
that the DAPC process would take about eighteen months, but
that the committee would produce an interim document sometime
during the first year.
4. Starting the Committee Process
On July 9, 1984, the Mayor announced the formation of a
Downtown Area Plan Committee (DAPC) to produce a plan for
future public and private development of Downtown Denver.
The DAPC would be governed by a "broad based policy
committee" appointed by the Mayor, which would be responsible
for coordinating a large, open process of designing the
10
plan. According to a joint statement by the City and the
Partnership, the DAPC would have three major goals: 1) to
create a common vision for downtown among the citizens of
Denver, and the major public and private actors in its
development, 2) to guide decisions regarding the development
and operation of downtown by public officials, developers,
residents, merchants, and property owners, and 3) to link the
investments of the public and private sectors to produce
higher quality development and greater citizen enjoyment of
11
downtown.
Products which would emanate from the DAPC included 1)
an urban design and vision statement, outlining the direction
for new development, presentation, public open space,
transit, pedestrian and auto circulation, parking,
streetscapes, and view corridors, 2) a strategic financial
plan, explaining how the City and private sources would pay
for capital improvements suggested in the plan, and the
expected revenue stream which the plan would generate, and 3)
a management plan, identifying how the plan would be
12
implemented. The plan would enjoy the same status as any
plan produced entirely internally by the City, and in fact,
be incorporated in the City's revised comprehensive plan.
At the first DAPC meeting on July 19, 1984, Straus and
the staff reviewed the role and responsibilities of the
committee. They emphasized that the committee was not to
design a downtown plan itself, but rather, design a framework
for the plan, and a process for gathering public input. Even
at this stage, some committee members were unclear about the
committee's responsibility, an issue which surfaced later in
14
the process.
The committee also discussed how they would make
decisions. At Straus's suggestion, it agreed to make
decisions in a "collaborative manner using consensus."
Straus did not spend much time, however, explaining his
duties as facilitator, or the consensus building process
generally. The committee also agreed to establish a smaller
executive committee to deal with ground rules, staffing
15
needs, and the budget. Initially, the executive committee
took a very limited role in the process.
5. An Initial Issue: Representation
At this first meeting, Eleanor Jefferson, the committee
representative from Interneighborhood Cooperation (INC),
argued that the neighborhoods close to downtown, comprised
mainly of Blacks and Hispanics, were not adequately
represented on the committee. Having agreed prior to the
meeting to support Jefferson, David Cole, the representative
from the Neighborhood Partnership, backed Jefferson's request
for two more INC representatives. Fleming, a Partnership
representative, disagreed with Jefferson. Apparently, the
two had discussed the issue before the meeting, and Fleming
.34
thought that they had resolved the issue. Other members of
the committee expressed concern that the 27 member committee
was already too large.
Straus let the discussion flow, believing that the issue
needed resolving before the committee could move on. After
extensive discussion, Cole suggested that they add two more
minority members, not affiliated with any particular
neighborhood organization. When Straus went around the room
and asked if anyone objected to the idea, many supported the
idea. The Director of the City's Commission on Community
Relations was asked to collect recommendations from committee
members and forward two names to the Mayor. By the next
meeting, a Hispanic and a Black had been added to the
16
committee as "mayoral appointees."
6. Gathering Information
At the urging of the Partnership and City staffs, the
committee spent the next several meetings receiving briefings
pertinent to downtown development. The briefings were of two
types. One type, conducted by the staff, consisted of
presentations on issues affecting downtown, including the
convention center, the Platte Valley, downtown retail,
transportation, Auraria Higher Education Center, and Cherry
17
Creek expansion. The second type consisted of lectures by
experts from Denver and other cities on larger trends,
including the impact of technology on downtown development,
economics and market trends, downtown retail, public spaces,
and housing. Again, the staff developed the lecture topics
35
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and chose the speakers.
Eventually, the committee told the staff to stop the
briefings. Members argued that they wanted to get a better
handle on the committee's own direction before receiving more
information. The staff resisted, but the committee
19
prevailed.
As a result of the briefings, some committee members
became concerned with the relationship of the DAPC to other
committees working on issues affecting downtown. The
representatives from the Partnership were particularly
concerned about the plans being developed by the Platte
Valley Development Committee and how they would affect
downtown. Fleming raised the issue at the end of a meeting
in December. As a result of the discussion, the committee
sent a letter to the Platte Valley Development Committee
stating its disapproval with four aspects of the Platte
Valley Plan: 1) the Plan's creation of a "barrier" effect
between downtown and the Valley, 2) the development of the
Valley without a major shift of market absorption from
downtown to the Valley, 3) housing and open space, and 4)
20
access to and from downtown.
7. Developing the Product
Throughout the briefing period, the committee also
discussed the scope and products of its work, and its
timeline. In September, the committee agreed that by
February, 1985, it would produce a document called "Concept
Denver" which would include information on Denver today,
summaries of the briefings, and a broadly scoped "vision
36
statement of the core area for year 2010." The committee
agreed that the vision statement would include a list of
critical issues facing downtown. Those issues would be the
21
focus of the next phase of the process.
At its January 10 meeting, the committee set to work
narrowing down some 35 issues which it had developed at prior
meetings. Straus emphasized the need to focus on the
"highest leverage issues which will make a difference in the
future of downtown," and Tom Gougeon, from the Mayor's
office, stressed the need to keep the list of issues short.
At Straus's suggestion, the committee broke into smaller
22
groups and prioritized the issues.
Eventually, the committee chose .five issues: 1)
connections between activity centers in downtown, 2) lower
downtown, 3) districts and transition zones connecting
downtown with the neighborhoods, 4) access to and circulation
within downtown, and 5) downtown retail. The committee
agreed to set up task forces for the first four issues, and
for the time being, monitor the fifth issue. (The City and
the Partnership were already involved in negotiations with
Oxford Properties to bring a major retail project to downtown
and the committee agreed that it would be inappropriate to
duplicate their efforts.) The task forces would be
responsible for devising specific design and development
solutions for their issue by soliciting community input, and
23
monitoring the work of other groups working on the issue.
B. Lower Downtown
Unlike the other issues, lower downtown was chosen as an
issue for reasons somewhat beyond the work of the committee.
Lower downtown has had a history of conflict between historic
preservationists and property owners over appropriate land
uses in the district. In September, 1984, Lisa Purdy, a
historic preservationist long involved in lower downtown and
a member of the DAPC, organized a group of lower downtown
property owners and historic preservationists to consider the
impact of a convention center at Union Station on lower
downtown. In a draft agreement, they proposed the creation
of a "Special Development District" for lower downtown, which
would include parking districts, additional housing
incentives, increased used of TDR's, design and development
review, creation of a "development and marketing office" in
the district, tax increment financing for public
improvements, and a smaller conservation district to preserve
24
historic structures. Before informing the DAPC of her
activities, Purdy told the City of the agreement on December
20. Eventually, the agreement was presented to the DAPC and
they agreed that it would be incorporated into the work of
25
the lower downtown task force. The committee members felt
it was important to take advantage of the momentum which the
agreement had established in lower downtown, and that the
Plan should not attempt to reinvent already existing ideas or
26
agreements.
9. Councilman Hackworth's Resignation
During a discussion at the January 10 meeting on
connections between activity centers in downtown, Councilman
38
Ted Hackworth questioned the importance of the issue. He
couldn't understand, he stated, why the committee was
concerned with walking connections between activity centers
when most people did not want to walk longer than five
minutes between locations. Committee members were
unsympathetic. Hackworth had been skeptical of the process
from the beginning, and most thought that his concern was
invalid, if not ridiculous. Eager to keep the meeting
moving, Straus acknowledged Hackworth's point but quickly
27
moved the discussion to another topic.
Hackworth left the meeting early, and attended no future
meetings. Three weeks later, the Rocky Mountain News
reported that Hack worth had resigned from the committee. The
article quoted Hackworth as claiming that the committee's
work had degenerated into nonsense, that it was not
addressing important issues like downtown retail, and that it
was being manipulated by special interest groups like
28
neighborhoods and historic preservation. Committee members
tried several times to contact Hackworth and urge him to
rejoin the committee, but Hackworth refused to return their
phone calls. Eventually, the committee decided to forget
Hackworth's resignation and get on with its agenda.
10. The Committee Rears its Head
At the committee's January 31 meeting, the staff
presented a draft of the Concept Plan which was to be issued
in February. The vision statement section of the draft
included a discussion of the five issues and their respective
task forces, but did not specify the actual procedures of the
29
task forces. A few days later, the staff called an interim
meeting of the committee to obtain its authorization to fund
the Concept Plan report, a slide show, and a poster. Straus
was not present at the meeting. Before the committee began
to discuss the prepared agenda, Lisa Purdy asked if the
30
committee could discuss the Concept Plan draft.
Purdy argued that the Plan as presently written was too
general, and had not established a framework for the
operations or agendas of the task forces. Several other
committee members agreed, and refused to go public with the
Plan until it contained specific issues for the task forces
to address and specific guidelines on how they should
proceed. The committee elected two chairpersons from the
executive committee, and instructed the executive committee
to design a process for establishing these elements of the
Plan. It also agreed to postpone issuing the report. The
staff was disappointed and frustrated, but had to follow the
31
committee's decision.
When Straus learned of the meeting, he was pleased that
the committee had finally taken ownership of its product.
Recognizing that resolving this issue might determine the
very future of the committee, he helped the executive
committee through a long meeting to figure out the next step
in the process. At the next committee meeting, the
chairpersons took control of the meeting, instructing the
staff and Straus to sit at the side of the room. Leaving
little room for discussion, they told the committee that it
40
would establish a framework subcommittee, which would spend
the next six to eight weeks developing more detailed concepts
for the operations of the task forces.
By May 1, the framework committee had completed its
task. At a weekend retreat, the whole committee reviewed the
committee's recommendations for how each task force will go
public with its respective issue. At this point, it is too
early to tell whether the committee will be able to look
beyond its initial difficulties and carry out its
responsibilities.
B. The Platte Valley Development Committee
1. Background
Denver's Platte River Valley consists of over 500
industrially zoned acres of land lying between downtown
Denver and a northwest Denver residential district, at the
confluence of the South Platte and Cherry Creek rivers, and
bordered by Interstate 25, Colfax Avenue, 23rd, and Wynkoop
Streets. (map, next page) Once the hub of Denver's mining,
railroad, and trade industries, the Platte Valley now serves
as the city's transportation and utility corridor. Railroads
and small industries dominate Valley activities.
As a major undeveloped area close to downtown, the
Platte Valley offers immense planning and development
opportunities. Presently, most Platte Valley land is worth
$2 - $10 per square foot, compared to $300 - $400 per square
foot in downtown. Greater possibilities exist for open
space, housing, and offices whose prices rival suburban
41
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office prices. The availability of such a large piece of
vacant land owned by relatively few landowners offers a
chance to create a large scale plan absent the problems of
relocation and demolition. The Cherry Creek and South Platte
Rivers could provide the water amenity so lacking in Denver.
The City holds two bargaining chips over developers
interested in the Valley. First, existing zoning in most of
the Valley does not permit housing or general retail, nor
does it provide height and density restrictions, design
review, open space requirements, or methods for avoiding
incompatible uses. Some developers wishing to risk
investment in the Valley, therefore, will want to obtain a
rezoning from the City Council before the-y move forward with
development projects. More important, the City must agree to
finance a portion of the enormous infrastructure improvements
necessary for redeveloping the Valley.
Several studies on the Platte Valley's reuse were
conducted prior to the Pefta Administration. One study, "In
Response to a Flood" was commissioned by Mayor Tom Currigan
in 1966 after a flood of the Platte in June, 1965 caused $325
million worth of damage in the Valley. While few of the
plan's ideas were implemented, it did set up the idea for
redevelopment of the Valley. Currigan also accomplished the
city's cleanup of the river itself and the damming of the
34
Platte upstream to prevent future flooding.
In 1975, BNL Development, whose parent company,
Burlington Northern, Inc., owns a large portion of Platte
43
Valley property, teamed up with Del Webb Realty and
Management Company to develop a "Concept Plan" for the
Valley. The plan suggested a wide variety of uses, including
housing, commercial centers, and parks and open space.
Negotiations between BNL and the city to implement the plan
eventually broke down because of an inability to reach
agreement on who would pay the infrastructure costs for
3_75
redevelopment.
During the downtown Denver building boom, developers
began to assemble large parcels of land in the Valley, caus-
ing land prices to rise. In 1982, The Goff Corporation
requested a rezoning for its twenty-two acre "Westbank" pro-
posal, to redevelop the old Forney car museum and the area
around it. While the nearby Jefferson - Highlands - Sunnyside
neighborhood organization approved of some of Goff's idea,
they protested his plans to build high rise offices, hotels,
and a 7000-car parking garage. Employing the courtesy zoning
mechanism, their city councilman, Sal Carpio, opposed the
rezoning. Deferring to Carpio's recommendation, City Council
eventually refused Goff's request. Council members also had
questions about Goff's financial backing and ownership
arrangement, and a general perception that piecemeal rezoning
36
was an inappropriate way to redevelop the Valley.
During the same year, the Denver Union Terminal Railway
Company (DUT), a consortium of six railroads that share Union
Station, announced their desire to redevelop eighteen acres
around the station. In addition, Mile High Land Associates,
a joint venture between Burlington Northern and Miller-
44
Klutznik-Davis-Gray, began to develop a plan for their 155
acres. Wary of suffering a fate similar to Goff's, Mile High
initiated seven months of meetings with an organization of
neighborhood groups, the Platte Valley Alliance of
Neighborhoods (PLAN), to gain their support for a rezoning
plan of their 155 acres. In response to apparent conflicts
in the plans and pressure from Carpio and the neighborhoods,
McNichols appointed a Platte Valley Framework Committee to
encourage the Platte Valley landowners to negotiate with each
other. McNichols intended that the city take only a
monitoring role in the negotiations; he wanted the developers
37
to propose the actual redevelopment plans.
One of PeNa's first actions when he took office was to
suspend the Framework Committee. The Mayor believed that the
City should take a more active role in the Valley's planning
process. To that end, he decided to establish a new
committee with greater participation by the City. He
instructed Lamont to develop the committee's process and
-73
agenda.
2. Representation
In selecting committee members, the Mayor had two
criteria. First, the process had to be manageable. Second,
everyone who would eventually have to approve the plan would
have to be represented. As a result, Pefta and planning
director Bill Lamont sought representatives from seven
different interest groups: 1) the Platte Valley landowners,
including Mile High, DUT, Trizec Corporation, Ltd., and a
45
Platte Valley Landowners Association (PVLA), who would have
to agree to redevelop their property in accordance with the
plan, 2) the City Council, which would have to approve
rezoning requests and implementation mechanisms, 3) the City,
which would have to provide a portion of infrastructure
costs, 4) the Partnership, whose influential membership could
provide support and expertise for the plan, as well as impede
a plan designed without their input, 5) the neighborhoods,
who were concerned about displacement caused by
redevelopment, and who could employ courtesy zoning to oppose
a rezoning request, 6) Auraria Higher Education Center, a
33,000 student, three university campus which lies directly
adjacent to the Platte Valley, and 7) the Denver Planning
Board, which would have to approve the plan before it went to
City Council. Peha and Lamont also decided that other
groups, including the Colorado Highway Department, railroads,
Urban Drainage and Flood Control District, RTD, city
agencies, university groups, and professional associations of
architects, planners, and landscape architects, would provide
resources and technical advice, but not be voting members of
39
the committee.
3. Beginning the Process
On February 8, 1984, Peha announced the formation of the
40
Platte Valley Development Committee (PVDC). The goal of
the committee was to "facilitate successful redevelopment of
the Platte Valley in a cooperative fashion." Active
involvement by the City would allow both developers and the
City to make financial commitments to the Valley with some
L4
41
certainty about the overall direction of the area. During
a "work program" of eight to nine months, the committee would
1) familiarize itself with issues in the Valley, 2) develop
goals for the Valley's redevelopment, 3) create a preferred
development scenario, and 4) adopt an implementation plan for
the scenario. PeNa instructed the committee to make periodic
reports to the Mayor, City Council, and the Planning Board.
Eventually, the committee was to make detailed
recommendations on issues including the rezoning of the
Platte Valley, financing techniques, allocations of costs
between the City and developers, and institutional
arrangements. The committee would be funded by local
foundations and the Platte Valley developers, and staffed by
42
the City Planning Office.
The committee held its first meeting on February 14,
1984. As unofficial chairperson, Lamont explained the
Mayor's charge to the committee and asked members to state
their goals and objectives for the committee's process and
activities. Some interesting comments came to light. PVDC
members wanted to create a climate in the Valley where
investments could take place with confidence, and where
rezoning requests could come to City Council with some
certainty that they would be approved. They did not,
however, want to take a lot of time, nor did they want to
43
have all discussions open to the public.
Early on, the committee decided to appoint an official
chairperson. Lamont had been serving a dual role as Planning
47
Director and committee chair, and the committee decided that
it preferred to have a more neutral member run its meetings.
Lamont supported the idea. The committee chose Stephanie
44
Foote, a City Council member on the committee.
3. The Facilitators
Lamont had not expected to use facilitators for the
PVDC. After the first meeting, at the urging of the
Partnership and Mile High Land Associates, however, he
enlisted the services of ACCORD Associates and the Center for
Public/Private Sector Cooporation (CCPSC) to help the
committee set up ground rules and processes, and determine
the resources that it would need. ACCORD is a private,
nonprofit organization which provides mediation, consulting,
and technical training in conflict resolution. John Huyler,
formerly with ACCORD, was the Project Director for the
Metropolitan Water Roundtable, an organization of thirty
representatives of the Denver metropolitan area, suburban
governments, agriculture, environmental groups, western
Colorado local governments and development interests who are
negotiating a blueprint for meeting Denver's future water
needs. Deanne Butterfield, from the CCPSC, specializes in
cooperative problem solving and intergovernmental
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relations. Huyler and Butterfield donated their services
for the initial organizing of the committee. The committee
then agreed to continue using their services "as long as
46
funding allowed."
Before the committee's next meeting, Huyler and
Butterfield interviewed committee members and compiled their
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suggestions for ground rules. The committee discussed those
ground rules at its second meeting. Among other things, the
rules required that members 1) make a "good faith attempt to
resolve issues collaboratively," before taking them to other
forums, 2) advise the committee of actions or decisions of
their organizations that are within the scope of committee
decisions, and 3) allow meetings to be open to the public as
47
often as possible. The committee also discussed the role of
the facilitators, and determined that they would be
responsible for forming agendas, getting members to agree to
those agendas before meetings, and facilitating the
48
meetings.
4. Gathering Information
The Committee then spent a two-day session organized by
Lamont and a Planning Office staff member, hearing
presentations from different groups involved in projects in
the Platte Valley, including the State, the City, Auraria,
private developers, and the neighborhoods. Those briefings
were compiled in a large document which provided committee
members and the public with current information on projects
in the Valley. Open to the public, the briefing sessions
attracted some 50 to 60 citizens each day. Committee members
generally felt that these briefings were extremely
49
informative.
Lamont and the staff also arranged and presented a
second set of briefings on more general issues, including
zoning, public finance, open space, and transportation. In
49
addition, the city arranged a detailed briefing by four local
market analysts on Platte Valley market conditions, including
information on the office, retail, and manufacturing markets,
50
as well as hotels, housing, and theme parks. Committee
members were less convinced about the value of these
briefings. There was some feeling that the Planning Office
staff was presenting biased information, and was not
responding to the members' requests for particular
51
information.
5. Abandoning the "Charette"
At one of its June meetings, the committee demonstrated
for the first time its frustration with the way Lamont and
the staff seemed to be controlling the process and direction
of the meetings. For a month, the committee had been
discussing an idea conceived by the Planning Office for a
five day "charette" during which a team of nationally known
consultants would visit the Valley and make recommendations
to the committee. Some committee members commented that the
charette was expensive and premature, and that they preferred
to start making decisions and developing specific proposals
rather than hearing more general comments from people
unfamiliar with Denver. For the first time, Mile High used
the fact that it was funding a large portion of the project
as a bargaining tool, threatening not to fund the charette.
Responding to Mile High's threat, the committee decided to
abandon the charette idea altogether. Instead, it requested
the staff to prepare for a two day working retreat. The
52
product would be a draft plan for the Valley.
As facilitator, Huyler encouraged the free flow of
discussion at the meeting. He commented later that he was
pleased that the committee was finally taking "ownership" of
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its process, and exerting control over the staff.
6. The Retreat and Draft Plan
Prior to the retreat, the City and the City Planning
Office documented, reviewed, and analyzed everyone's
development schemes of the Valley, and formed them into a
composite plan. At the retreat on July 21 and 22, committee
members revised and refined the composite plan. On July 27,
the committee presented its draft plan to the public. The
plan contained general proposals on six issues: 1)
consolidation of the railway corridor, 2) improved access to
the Valley, 35) mixed use development, 4) use of the Cherry
Creek and South Platte Rivers, 5) open space, and 6)
connections to surrounding neighborhoods. In addition, the
plan divided the Valley into ten subareas. Each subarea
contained guidelines on character, land area, uses,
densities, incentives, open space, parking, and other
54
amenities.
7. Eliminating the Facilitators
The committee decided to stop using ACCORD and CCPSC
after the retreat. There seemed to be three reasons for this
decision. First, many committee members felt that although
the facilitators had provided valuable advice in terms of
process design and ground rules, that they could not help the
committee in its second stage, making the difficult decisions
51
about specific elements of the Platte Valley plan. According
to some committee members, the facilitators' system of
stating interests and values did not result in actual
deci si onmaki ng.
Second, the committee recognized that the facilitators'
services had been expensive. As of September 19, the
committee had paid ACCORD and CCPSC $27,000, 304 of its
$87,000 income from foundations, the developers, and the
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City. Since foundations had not come through with some of
the funding which the committee had expected, the committee
decided that it could no longer afford the facilitators's
services. Third, some committee members had been
uncomfortable with the process from the beginning and were
more than happy to return to the traditional decisionmaking
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methods to which they were accustomed.
8. Setting up the Technical Committees
In August, the committee decided to set up six Technical
Committees to go into more detail on the different elements
of the draft plan: 1) land use/economics, 2) transportation,
3) open space! flood control/urban design 4) Auraria, 5)
finance/institutional, and 6) community affairs. The
technical committees met separately to gather information and
develop more specific proposals related to their topics. The
committee hired a planning consultant, Doug Houston, to help
with technical committee data collection and reports. For the
next few weeks, the technicals committees made progress
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reports to the whole committee.
By October 24, the technical committees had completed
evaluation of most of the elements of the composite plan.
Still, committee members recognized that they had made no
decisions on controversial elements of the plan. Foote and
Lamont felt that the committees were beginning to go into too
much detail and to make decisions which should be made by the
whole committee. The committee decided, therefore, to meet
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weekly to work out the final details of the plan.
9. The Convention Center
The convention center issue, however, blew up in
November. As explained earlier, the convention center task
force chose Currigan Hall as its preferred site, and PeNa
requested the landowners to resubmit bids for all three
sites. Because Mile High's plan depended so heavily on the
site selection decision, the committee made little progress
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during November and December.
10. The Railroad Alignment Decision
On December 7, the committee approached its first major
decision: how to consolidate and where to locate the
railroads in the Platte Valley. Recognizing that reaching
agreement might be difficult, Lamont called Huyler before the
meeting and asked him to facilitate it. The railroad
subcommittee had come up with three possible locations: 1)
the "Westbank" alignment, along the east edge of Interstate-
25, between the Valley and the northwest Denver neighborhood,
2) the existing Burlington Northern alignment (BN alignment),
which runs at grade through the middle of the Valley, and 3)
the "revised BN alignment," which would partially depress the
existing BN alignment. Huyler asked each committee member to
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voice his opinion on the issue.
David Cole, from the northwest Denver neighborhoods, and
Tom Ragonetti, representing Trizec, were the most outspoken
against the Westbank alignment. Cole insisted that the
alignment would separate them from the river, bring hazardous
materials closer to residential areas, and remove existing
amenities and historic structures on the Westbank. Ragonetti
argued that the alignment would ruin Trizec's site, which had
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taken substantial time and money to assemble.
In spite of Cole's and Ragonetti's comments, several
committee members still supported the Westbank alignment.
The Partnership, for example, believed that the alignment was
best for downtown, since it would eliminate a barrier between
downtown and the Platte Valley. Gougeon and the Planning
Office believed that it made the most sense from a design
standpoint to place the railroad at the edge of the Valley
rather than through the middle. Yet neither of them were
willing to risk vocalizing their positions and alienating the
neighborhoods. Gougeon finally stated that the City would be
willing to accept the BN Alignment, as long as the Planning
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Office could continue to analyze the issue.
A major procedural issue came up at this meeting.
Contrary to the ground rules which the committee had
established, Cole and Ragonetti suggested that the committee
vote on the rail alignment decision. Huyler explained that
voting on the issue would violate the process which the
committee had adopted, and severely undermine the committee's
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ability to insure buy in to its decisions. As it turned out,
the committee did not vote, but rather, agreed to select the
6 3
BN alignment with Gougeon's condition.
11. Final Negotiations
In December, the committee recognized that it still
needed to reach agreement on particular aspects of the draft
plan, and agreed to postpone its deadline for its
recommendations to the Mayor. Meanwhile, the Mayor
instructed his aides to reach some agreement with Mile High
so that the developers could submit their convention center
bid free of conditions. In early January, city officials and
Mile High reached tentative agreements on their differences
relating to 1) land uses (including housing) and densities,
2) heights, 3) open space, 4) infrastructure, and 5) barriers
64
and design.
In January, the committee authorized the City to meet
privately with each committee member to insure that each was
satisfied with the plan's treatment of its property, and
would be willing to enter into development agreements
consistent with the plan. The City met with the committee
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members in January and February.
12. The Written Agreement
By May 1, the Planning Office had prepared a packet of
draft policy statements for the plan, generated from the
discussions with committee members. Once the committee
agrees to the statements, Concept Denver will be presented to
the Denver Planning Board, the Mayor, and City Council,
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probably in June, 1985.
The document contains statements on the six issues
described earlier. First, it describes allowable land uses
and densities for eleven subareas in the Valley. Each
subarea is allowed a certain floor area ratio (F.A.R.),
F.A.R. bonuses, and transfers of density within subareas in
exchange for certain uses. Certain areas are set aside for
housing. If housing is not built within ten years after
infrastructure and access are within reach, property owners
must agree to 1) submit a firm commitment for the
construction of residential units, 2) joint venture with the
City to build housing, using the reserved residential area as
free land, or 3) donate the required area to the City so that
residential units can be built by the City.
Second, the document establishes three categories of
maximum building heights for the subareas: 1) "point" towers
of 18 - 22 stories having relatively small floor plates and
clustered throughout the Valley, 2) mid-rise structures of
ten to twelve stories on smaller parcels, and 3) lower
structures of five to seven stories located along water
amenities. In some cases, transfers of development density
will allow exemption from the height district limits.
Third, the document provides for almost 150 acres of
open space, and establishes priorities for the uses and
activities for the open space, including biking and jogging
paths, plazas, entertainment, and landscaping.
With respect to infrastructure, the agreement provides
that the City will invest funds in the earliest years to
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"prime the pump" before revenues from private development can
be captured, but also provides that "the primary
beneficiaries of development bear the greatest burden of the
cost." The major sources of funding will be a tax increment
financing district, which can issue long term bonds to be
paid in future years from the incremental revenues generated
by development, and special districts, which can also issue
long term bonds.
Regarding barriers and design, the document discusses
general design goals: conserving tradition street patterns,
designing facades harmonious with existing facades, promoting
setbacks, using interesting designs and materials, and
promoting public art. Future development agreements will
provide for design review.
The document also contains specific priorities for
automobile circulation, traffic improvements, and mass
transit, which are designed to enhance access to different
development sites as well as downtown. In addition, the
document provides that the railroads will be consolidated
into a main corridor behind the Union Station Terminal, and
depressed as much as possible.
The document also contains a general discussion about
implementation, suggesting the need for a lead agency,
separate from existing City departments, to administer the
agreement. It recognizes, however, that determining the
exact type of agency will require further study.
13. Implementing the Plan
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Assuming that City Council approves the plan, the
Planning Office will begin to determine the type of mechanism
which will implement the plan. The committee has suggested
designating the entire Platte Valley as an urban renewal
area, so that it will be eligible for tax increment
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financing. The committee has endorsed using the Denver
Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) as the lead agency for Platte
Valley redevelopment, but restructuring the agency to fit
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that role. The Planning Office, however, supports an
institutional mechanism which would give it a more direct
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role in implementation, monitoring, and enforcement.
Whatever the lead agency, it will enforce the plan by
entering into a number of contractual agreements: 1) a
Master Cooperation agreement between the City and DURA, 2)
specific agreements with DURA and other non city agencies
related to financing, infrastructure construction, and
special districts, and 3) participation and development
agreements between the City and the developers of particular
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sites covered by the plan.
E. Public Perception of the Process
Assuming that most citizens learned about the committees
through local media, public awareness of both the DAPC and
the PVDC seems to have been quite limited. From February,
1984, when the PVDC got underway, to March, 1985, the Denver
Post, one of Denver's two major newspapers, carried fewer
than fifteen articles about either of the committees. Part
of the problem is that the press does not know how to report
on the committee process, and individual reporters do not
have the time or the patience to sit through long meetings to
find out what the committee is doing. The articles which did
appear in the papers concerned only the announcement of the
committees and significant committee events or decisions,
like the PVDC railroad alignment decision, or Hackworth's
resignation from the DAPC.
The Denver Post reacted positively to the initial
announcements of the committees. Commenting on the PVDC, the
paper said that the committee presented a great opportunity
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to do a comprehensive plan with goals and a vision.
Similarly, an editorial on the DAPC stated:
The process will offer Denver's leaders as well as its
ordinary citizens an unprecedented chance to be visionary
and realistic at the same time. Naturally, the result
will be meaningless unless all involved are willing to
work together in a genuine spirit of cooperation and
commitment. 72
As the processes wore on, however, the newspapers seemed
to lose their patience. On November 18, for example, the
Rocky Mountain News headline stated "Platte Project Stymied,"
and the accompanying article explained how Mile High was
threatening to pull out of the project because of the
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committee's decision to postpone its December 7 deadline.
(see Appendix B) The Denver Post also carried several
articles regarding the committees' inability to make
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decisions.
An even more negative editorial about the DAPC showed up
in the Rocky Mountain News in March, 1985. Al Knight, the
assistant managing editor of the paper, questioned the
effectiveness of the facilitators:
59?
They keep attention focused and they fill up huge
expanses of butcher paper draped over every available
inch of wall space. In their tasks they use different
colored inks for different kinds of ideas. It has
been said that a planning or "consensus building"
facilitator is an ordinary yuppie in all respects
save for hands that have become gnarled from holding
all those highlight pens at the same time.
His editorial also pointed out that no product had come from
the committee. A sarcastic cartoon, mimicking the types of
diagrams and phrases used by the facilitators, accompanied
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the editorial. (see Appendix A)
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SECTION III: Evaluating the Committee Processes
A. Process
To analyze the successes and failures of the committee
processes, I interviewed several committee members as well as
committee staff. Because I was unable to speak to every
committee member, I tried to interview members whom I thought
would present diverse perspectives on the committee.
Specifically, I interviewed the following people associated
with the Downtown Plan Committee:
1. Tom Gougeon, Mayor's Office, DAPC Co-Chair
2. George Beardsley, Partnership Representative
3. David Cole, The Neighborhood Partnership
Representative
4. Lisa Purdy, historic preservation representative
5. Richard Fleming, Partnership Representative
6. David Straus, Facilitator
7. Eileen Byrne, Partnership Staff
8. Will Fleissig, The Denver Planning Office
I also interviewed the following members of the Platte Valley
Development Committee:
1. Bill Lamont, Denver Planning Office, Co-chair
2. Tom Gougeon, Mayor's Office Representative
3. Phillip Milstein, Planning Board Representative
4. Tom Ragonetti, Attorney and Representative for
Trizec, a Platte Valley landowner
5. David Cole, PLAN Representative
6. Peter Neukirk, Mile High Land Associates Representative
7. Richard Fleming, Partnership Representative
B. John Huyler, ACCORD
9. Gordon Appell, City Staff
I focused the interviews on the interviewees'
impressions of the committee processes and activities thus
far. I urged them to discuss both positive and negative
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aspects of the committees and to give me specific examples to
illustrate their comments.
B. Framework for Analysis
Reporting the impressions of interviewees regarding the
committee processes required me to develop a framework for
evaluation. I adopted a framework which analyzes nine
elements of the processes: 1) Incentives to Negotiate, 2)
Representation, 3) Developing the Agenda 4) Fact Finding, 5)
Coalition Building, 6) Entry and Work of Facilitators, 7)
Staff, 8) the Written Agreement, and 9) Assumptions about
1
Implementation, Monitoring and Enforcement.
1. Incentives to Negotiate
Successful negotiations usually require that the parties
have some reason for sitting at the negotiating table -- an
incentive to negotiate. Fisher and Ury argue that this
incentive encompasses a parties' BATNA, or best alternative
to a negotiated agreement. Bacow and Wheeler suggest that
any proposed settlement must be at least a bit "better" than
the parties' BATNAs, or alternatives of not settling. In
land use disputes, a party's BATNA usually involves his
perception of what he can accomplish through traditional
administrative, legislative, and judicial decisionmaking
processes.
The four major participants in the PVDC had strong
incentives to negotiate. The developers needed guarantees
from the City to provide infrastructure, as well as rezoning
from the City Council. The recognized that traditional
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decisionmaking processes had fostered time consuming disputes
with the neighborhoods, opposition from City Council, and
inadequate infrastructure guarantees. By participating on
the committee, they hoped to accelerate approvals and
increase public contributions for their projects.
The neighborhoods (PLAN) felt that by negotiating, they
might win open space and housing, protect themselves from
land price speculation, and ameliorate the negative impacts
of increased traffic and densities. Using "courtesy zoning"
would only allow the neighborhoods to block development, it
did not provide ways for the neighborhoods to accept
development with conditions.
For the Denver Partnership, participation on the PVDC
might insure as little competition between the Platte Valley
and downtown as possible, linkage between the two areas, and
better access to downtown through the Platte Valley. Its
alternative method for addressing those concerns, using the
political pull of its membership, might weaken the City's
support for the Downtown Plan, and other downtown interests.
For the City, a successful negotiation would enhance the
possibility of economic development and corresponding tax
revenues from the Valley. In addition, success would help
the Mayor politically--reelection was only two years away,
and the "great city" looked much as it did two years before.
By allowing the Platte Valley decisions to go through
traditional channels, the Mayor would lose his ability to
influence the direction of the Valley, and would be unable to
take credit for a successful development plan.
I-3_
Few of the DAPC members had such identifiable incentives
to negotiate. The Partnership members had the greatest
incentive--a downtown plan could enhance downtown's
attractiveness for business, entertainment, and shopping, and
result in a stronger downtown economic climate. By designing
the Plan singlehandedly, the Partnership might lose support
from the Mayor and the newly empowered Planning Office.
The City's incentive to negotiate was less apparent.
Certainly, the Mayor recognized the importance of the
economic development and beautification of downtown, but it
was not clear that the Downtown Plan committee could produce
a better plan than the Partnership or the Planning Office
could produce alone. Probably a greater incentive came from
a recognition of the political strength of the Partnership
membership and a need to appear supportive of their
interests.
Beyond the Partnership and the City, the other DAPC
members had few incentives to negotiate. Lisa Purdy felt
that sitting at the table might allow her to voice
preservation interests. Yet her negotiations with the
downtown property owners outside the committee indicated that
she felt that she could still operate effectively without the
committee. The neighborhoods had little incentive beyond
that of enhancing downtown's attraction and insuring better
physical connections between downtown and the adjacent
neighborhoods, but it was not clear that participation on the
committee would result in better results than airing their
concerns through traditional methods.
These differences in incentives to negotiate may explain
why the PVDC took. ownership of its process early on, and
rejected efforts by the City staff to guide the committee's
agenda and decisions, and why the DAPC did not take control
over the staff and its product until it actually saw a draft
of the concept plan and realized that it was to be publicized
as the work of the committee. The fact that the Partnership
seemed to have more reasons for participating on the DAPC
than the other members also seemed to foster some distrust
among DAPC members.
Generally, committee members may be more committed to a
process where they recognize and understand the importance of
the committee's agenda and the need for reaching solutions.
In addition, they may be more willing to accept the decisions
of the committee if they feel that those decisions emanate
from the committee process rather from the motivation of a
particular committee member controlling the process.
2. Representation
Identifying the negotiating parties in public sector
land use disputes presents particular difficulties. If every
possible stakeholder in the negotiation sits at the
bargaining table, the process can become unmanageable. If
certain stakeholders are excluded from the process, however,
they may try to block the agreement at a later time. Often,
it is difficult to insure that committee members actually
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represent and have authority to speak. for their interests.
The PVDC problem was clearly defined from the beginning,
so it was more apparent to the City who should sit on the
committee. As a result, every voting member of the committee
had an incentive to negotiate, as described earlier. By
including nonvoting members, the City insured participation
by a large variety of stakeholders without making the process
unmanageable. In addition, committee members for the most
part could be assured that other committee members actually
represented their interests, and had authority to speak for
those interests.
Because the DAPC problem was not as well defined, it was
less clear to the City and the Partnership which interests
should be represented on the committee, and who should
represent those interests. As a result, the committee seems
to be comprised more of a "blue ribbon panel" than of
representatives of particular interests. The representation
discussion early in the DAPC process, for example, indicated
that the neighborhood representatives did not feel that they
could represent all neighborhood interests. In addition,
several members of the committee felt that its membership,
twenty-seven, made the process difficult to manage.
The different aspects of representation on the
committees affect committee members' perceptions of the
fairness of the processes, and their impressions about the
committees' ability to implement its decisions.
Representation is most likely to become an issue as the
committee plans are publicized. Because DAPC representatives
are so loosely tied to the interests which they are supposed
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to represent, it would not be surprising if new stakeholders
surfaced. On the other hand, since the committee will be
soliciting community input at the task force stage of its
process, those additional stakeholders may still have an
opportunity to participate before the plan is implemented.
The PVDC will probably have fewer problems implementing
its plan, because all the important stakeholders seem to have
had an opportunity to participate in the process, either by
sitting on the committee or by presenting information to the
committee. It is notable that two railroads who chose not to
participate in the PVDC, Rio Grande and Union Pacific, are
now requesting information from the Planning Office to see
how their interests will be affected by the plan, and
attending all PVDC meetings.
Developing the Agenda
Susskind and Ozawa argue that the points to consider in
a negotiation and in what order to address them should be
5
considered at the outset of the negotiation. It also seems
particular parties should not dominate the agenda. Small
parties controlled the agendas of both committees. On the
DAPC, the Partnership staff and Straus initially set the
agendas. At each meeting, they would present the agenda and
ask if anyone objected. After members of the executive
committee took control of the process, however, they also
took control of agendamaking.
Early in the PVDC process, the facilitators were
responsible for developing the agenda by conferring with
individual committee members. Some committee members
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commented, however, that the Planning Office and Mile High
had the largest influence on the agenda. This was even more
the case after the facilitators were eliminated from the
committee. Some members commented they never knew what they
would be discussing at a meeting until the meeting took
place.
These aspects of agendamaking had some important effects
on the committees. Because they had not helped design the
agendas, many committee members felt that important issues
were excluded from discussions. The DAPC's decision to
redesign its concept plan so late in the process exemplifies
the problems which can occur when the whole committee does
not agree on its agenda early in the process. Exclusion from
agendamaking may cause committee members to lose trust in or
commitment to the process.
4. Fact Finding
The committees' experiences with fact finding indicate
that the parties will be more willing to accept a base of
information when they have participated in gathering it. On
the DAPC, the briefings were entirely staff initiated and
controlled, and took place before committee members had a
clear sense of the information that it needed. This enhanced
committee members' sense that the Partnership staff
controlled their agenda and decisions. Because the committee
did not have a clear sense of its direction, however, it took
several meetings before the committee decided not to continue
the briefings.
Similarly, Planning Office staff initiated and controlled
the PVDC briefings, but with one important difference. The
first PVDC briefings consisted of presentations by committee
members themselves about their particular interests or
projects in the Platte Valley. This gave committee members a
sense that they were participating in the fact finding
process, and that their information was not controlled by one
party. It was not until the second set of briefings, when
Planning Office staff decided what information the committee
needed and who should present it, that the committee reacted
negatively. The technical committees also gave committee
members an opportunity to gather information for the
committee.
5. Coalition Building
Members from neither committee described strong
coalitions that had developed among committee members on
particular issues. DAPC members commented that the committee
had not yet reached an issue where members took opposing
positions. In fact, one member commented that the six issues
which the committee chose were the issues which no one
disagreed on, rather than those which the committee agreed
were the most important. The only coalition which members
identified was between the neighborhoods and historic
preservation regarding their disapproval of the first draft
of the concept plan.
PVDC members identified the coalition formed by
Ragonetti and Cole on the rail alignment issue. This may be
significant since neighborhood groups and developers have
traditionally been a
issues. The committ
for recognizing that
positions are varie
similar. Also, Ragon
supported each other
themselves on the rail
6. Entry and Wor
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k of the Facilitators
the facilitators entered the processes
embers' willingness to trust them and
h the committees. Straus was hired by
Fleming's recommendation. Committee
e the decision that they needed a
they participate in choosing him.
no knowledge of Straus's track record
In contrast, the PVDC itself decided
tterfield, and determined their role,
albeit limited. Huyler also had an established track record
in Denver, due to his work with the Denver Water Roundtable.
Few of the members from either committee thought the
facilitators were particularly effective in assisting the
processes of their committees. DAPC members criticized
Straus for three reasons, which can be blamed, for the most
part, on factors beyond Straus's control. First, Straus was
not from Denver, and was unfamiliar with Denver politics and
its major actors. He came to the city the night before the
DAPC meetings, and left as soon as they were over. As a
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result, DAPC members felt that Straus was unaware of the
dissatisfaction of committee members, and did not have a good
sense of their interpersonal dynamics. Second, because
of Straus's association with the Partnership, most of his
information about the committee came from the Partnership
staff. Many DAPC members felt that this undermined Straus's
ability to serve as a neutral party, and prejudiced his
opinions about how the committee was operating. Third,
committee members faulted Straus for failing to fulfill what
they considered his primary responsibilities: insuring that
committee members were permitted to express their opinions,
and insuring that the committee members knew what decisions
they had made. One committee member cited the Hackworth
incident as an example of Straus's failure to insure that a
committee member's issues were listened to and dealt with
adequately.
PVDC members had very different responses to their
facilitators. They praised Huyler and Butterfield for
talking to committee members before meetings and getting a
sense of the important issues which different members wanted
to address. (Huyler and Butterfield were able to stay this
close to the process, in part, because they lived in the area
and knew most of the participants on the committee.)
Committee members also felt that the facilitators had been
very effective in helping the committee establish ground
rules early in the process.
Committee members questioned, however, the facilitators'
effectiveness beyond the committee's initial organizing
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phase. Several commented that Huyler and Butterfield's
facilitating style did not lend itself to tough
decisionmaking, particularly on complicated land use issues.
Technical issues, they commented, got lost or glossed over.
There seemed to be no method for getting from the point where
everyone lays his interest on the table to the point where
the committee reaches a decision about a particular use or
density for a piece of property. Some members felt, however,
that Huyler and Butterfield's ineffectiveness was due, in
part, to Lamont's reluctance to relinquish control. Whatever
the reasons, the ultimate result was that Huyler and
Butterfield had extremely limited roles in the PVDC process.
7. Staff
Like the role of the facilitators, the role of the
staffs of each committee generated much discussion among
interviewees. In general, they felt that the staffs had
tried to exert too much control over the committees. It is
interesting that both committees eventually reached a point
where they took control of process and decisionmaking away
from the staffs.
The DAPC had two problems related to its staff. First,
because the Partnership staff had been working on a downtown
plan prior to the formation of the committee, they had
already formed ideas and developed expertise about particular
aspects of the plan. The committee, on the other hand, began
with few preconceptions about the plan. As the staff grew
impatient with the committee process, it tried to encourage
the committee to develop a plan which was consistent with the
Partnership's ideas and which tied into the work which they
had already completed. This led many committee members to
suspect that their work was predetermined for them and
created distrust between committee members and the
Partnership staff.
Second, because the Partnership staff had been working
on downtown issues for a long time, they inevitably
conflicted with the Planning Office staff, some of whom were
new to Denver and the Planning Office. Considerable
animosity developed between the two staffs, which hindered
their ability to work for the committee effectively.
The PVDC staff also seemed to have preconceived ideas
about the Platte Valley plan. Because PVDC members had more
expertise and more vested interests in particular elements of
the plan, however, they were less willing to let the staff
control their process or decisions. Committee members
criticized the staff for failing to follow the instructions
or respond to the committee's requests for certain
information.
8. The Written Agreement
At this point, only the PVDC has neared a formal written
agreement. The draft policies seem very comprehensive, and
indicate concensus on a number of difficult issues. Every
parties' interests seem to be addressed. The developers have
specific land uses, heights, and density allowances, and
assurances from the City that it will fund infrastructure
early on. The neighborhoods have 150 acres of open space and
significant housing requirements. The City has assurances
from the developers to build housing or donate land for it,
as well as agreements from the developers to finance later
infrastructure. The Partnership has assurances about access
to downtown and mitigation of barriers between downtown and
the Valley. Historic preservation, design, transportation,
and flood control are also addressed. Assuming that City
Council approves the plan, and that the proper implementation
mechanisms are developed, the agreement has a good chance of
being carried out.
The DAPC's Concept Denver will consist of statements,
both general and specific, about the issues on which the
steering committee intends to focus, and guidelines for
eliciting public input on those issues. Presumably, steering
committee members in charge of the different issues will be
expected to abide by the framework set up in the document.
The actual agreement, however, will not result until after
the public participation stage.
9. Assumptions about Implementation, Monitoring, and
Enforcement
While neither committee has reached the implementation,
monitoring, or enforcement phases of its processes, the PVDC
seems to have developed much clearer assumptions about those
aspects of its plan than has the DAPC.
From the beginning, the PVDC knew that it would have to
develop a framework for implementing the huge number of
development decisions which the Platte Valley plan would
contain. This was particularly important because each
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committee member wanted to insure that other committee
members would abide by the decisions made in by the
committee. As a result, the committee created an
implementation subcommittee early in its process. That
subcommittee developed specific recommendations about how the
development decisions will be put into effect, and who will
monitor and enforce them. At this point, the committee is
suggesting that the plan will be implemented through a large
series of development agreements, and that an Urban Renewal
type authority will have the power to monitor and enforce
the agreements. Even though the plan is considered to be an
advisory document, the committee has assumed all along that
the Mayor and the City Council will follow their
recommendations.
From the beginning, the DAPC was less concerned about
how its product would be implemented, monitored, or enforced.
This might be due to the fact that the committee was not
clear about its product, and that few committee members had
vested interests in seeing their product realized. It was
not until the first phase of its plan, announcing the
creation of the task forces, was almost publicized that the
committee suddenly realized that it had not determined how it
would actually implement the task forces. The committee then
had to backtrack on its process, and spend several weeks
working on its implementation plans. Also, the initial
announcement of the committee stated that the final downtown
plan would be incorporated into the City's comprehensive
plan. It is not clear, however, that
understand or have thought about how
committee will actually be realized.
committee members
the work of the
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SECTION IV: Conclusions
Proponents of mediated negotiation have established five
criteria for evaluating the success of a negotiation. First,
the negotiation should produce an efficient agreement--one
that maximizes the gains of all the parties. Second, the
agreement should minimize the expenditure of time and money
in reaching the agreement. Third, the agreement should
appear fair to the parties and to the broader community.
Fourth, the agreement should be implementable--that is, the
parties should be willing and able to carry out the terms of
the agreement. Fifth, the process should improve, or at
1
least not damage the relationships among the parties.
It is too early to make conclusive evaluations of the
committees with respect to those five criteria. The PVDC
seems to be achieving some of those criteria, but the
agreement has yet to pass the test of implementability, and
it is unclear whether the broader community accepts the
agreement. The DAPC seems to be achieving fewer of those
criteria--it has already spent considerable time and money,
and the relationships between the parties are somewhat
strained. The committee has yet to produce an agreement that
can be evaluated with respect to the interests of the parties
or the broader community.
Still, analysis of the two committees suggests that
mediated negotiations have a better chance of meeting those
criteria when the City can insure the existence of six
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conditions: 1) public officials have the political ability
to gather support for nontraditional decisionmaking , 2) the
parties to the negotiation have clear incentives to
negotiate, 3) third party facilitators have special
expertise about the issues to be negotiated, are familiar to
the parties and the community, and maintain a neutral
position with respect to the parties in the negotiation, 4)
the negotiation involves specific, finite issues, and 5) the
parties have a clear understanding about how the agreement
will fit bac into traditional legal channels for
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement.
1.. Publ.ic officials should be able to gather sugpor t
for nontraditional decisionmaking.
Mediated negotiation presents two political problems for
public officials. First, it focuses as much on process as it
does on results. While ultimately more durable, the
negotiation may seem more time consuming and less result
oriented than traditional decisionmaking. But the press, the
public, and the negotiating parties often demand immediate
results. Public officials, therefore, must be able to
convince critics that the results of mediated negotiation are
worth the added time and cost.
Mediated negotiation may also require public officials
to take a less forceful roles in decisionmaking, acting as
only one of many parties at the negotiating table. But that
role varies from traditional leadership models, which
describe strong leaders as those who can make decisions
individually and sell them to the public. Public officials
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using mediated negotiation must be able to overcome charges
that they lack leadership or decisionmat.k:ing abilities.
Peha's experiences with the DAPC and the PVDC illustrate
these two problems. Reelection year is 1987, and he needs to
be able to point to tangible results of his first term. The
committees may eventually reach workable long term
agreements. If they do not show progress in the short term,
however, Peha will. have nothing to show for his first four
years in office. If the committees fail, Pefta will have to
overcome charges that his committees were weak substitutes
for a strong administrator. At least he has the advantage of
his election year mandate to experiment with new planning
ideas.
Public officials, therefore, need to find ways to gather
support for mediated negotiation. They should work to
educate the press and the public about the processes. They
should also make efforts to create newsworthy successes along
the way, so that the public feels that the process is
achieving tangible results.
2. The 2arties should have clear incentives to
negotiate,
Mediated negotiation works better where parties
recognize that the potential agreement will win them more--or
cost them less--than they would have won or spent in
conventional legislative, administrative, or judicial
processes. Incentives to negotiate encourage the parties to
participate actively, and take responsibility for the
processes and decisions of the negotiation. The PVDC
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demonstrates how incentives to negotiate encouraged the
parties to stay committed to the process. The fact that
conventional processes had failed to achieve successful
solutions in the Valley provided an added incentive to enter
the negotiations.
Where it appears that conventional processes will reach
solutions just as acceptable as mediated negotiation, public
officials should question the wisdom of using mediated
negotiation. In the case of the DAPC, for example, the Mayor
might have considered letting the Partnership design the plan
itself, and waiting to see if it survived the comprehensive
plan process.
If public officials decide to use mediated negotiation,
they should work to increase the incentives to negotiate by
making conventional decisionmaking appear less attractive.
For example, Peha might have told the neighborhoods that he
would not support their interests in downtown unless they
were willing to participate on the DAPC.
3. Third party facilitators should have special
expertise about the issues to be negotiated. be
familiar to the parties and the community, and
maintain a neutral position with respect to the
par:ties In the negotiation.
The list of examples of successful mediated negotiation
is still relatively short. Third party facilitators must be
able to overcome the skepticism inherent in any attempt to
deviate from conventional decisionmaking mechanisms. The
PVDC and the DAPC indicate that facilitators are more likely
to overcome that skepticism if 1) they have special expertise
about the issues to be negotiated, 2) they are familiar to
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the parties and the community, and 3) they maintain a neutral
position with respect to the parties in the negotiation.
When the facilitator has special expertise in the
subject matter of the negotiation, he or she may be more able
to separate important debates from less important ones,
recognize the validity of particular statements, and steer
the parties towards decisionmaking. Huyler's problems on the
PVDC demonstrate the importance of this quality. Many
committee members questioned his expertise in real estate
finance and land use, and were thus reluctant to let him
control too much of the committee process.
Straus demonstrates the importance of using facilitators
who are familiar to the committee members and the community,
and the importance of maintaining a neutral position in the
negotiation. If he had known the city and the committee
members' interests beforehand, he might have better
understood the interpersonal dynamics which were occurring in
the committee and the Partnership's particular bias on the
committee. If he had made more attempts to view the
committee through perspectives other than the Partnership's,
he might have enhanced his effectiveness in working with the
committee.
4. The negotiation should involve specific, finite issues.
The experiences of the two committees indicate that
mediated negotiation works more effectively in cases where
the issues are specific and finite. Both committees had
difficulty determining which issues to negotiate. At least
B 1
the PVDC knew the possible issues which it could negotiate--
it merely had to decide on which issues to focus. The link
between the Convention Center selection and the Platte Valley
plan, however, prevented the committee from addressing the
Platte Valley issues separately.
The DAPC, on the other hand, had to actually develop
the range of possible issues which it could deal with before
deciding on a select few. Hackworth resigned primarily
because he was frustrated with the issue selection process
and did not feel that the committee was discussing the
important issues.
Before using mediated negotiation, therefore, the City
should examine the particular situation to see that there is
at least an identifiable set of issues which demand
resolution. With those issues generally described, the
parties can more easily refine the issues, and determine
which issues they will deal with.
5. The City 2nd thg parties to the negotiation shoud
have a clear understanding g how their agreement
will fit back into traditional legal channels for
implementati on mgnitoring, and enforcement.
No matter how brilliant the agreement, if it cannot be
implemented it is worthless. Mediated negotiation in the
public sector presents special problems in this area, because
agreements must be funneled back into traditional mechanisms
for implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. When the
City and the parties have a clear understanding of how that
funneling will occur, mediated negotiation has a better
chance of succeeding. That their agreement will be binding
p) '-:
will encourage the parties to take the negotiation seriously,
and establish credibility for the process in the eyes of the
press and the public.
The fact that the PVDC has had a better understanding of
how its agreement will be implemented than the DAPC has
fostered greater support and credibility for the PVDC
process. The parties have taken the negotiation seriously,
and parties who were not involved in the original process are
now participating in committee meetings. Particularly given
the political risks that the Mayor is taking in using the
committee, this support and credibility is extremely
important.
The Mayor deserves support for his efforts to take land
use issues out of traditional decisionmaking processes. He
should understand, however, that successful mediated
negotiation requires the existence of a particular context
and certain conditions. The more he can learn to create
these conditions, the better chance he has to take advantage
of mediated negotiation and its potential for positive
results. When successfully organized and operated,
committees like the DAPC and the PVDC can develop land use
solutions which are more easily implemented, better informed,
and of higher quality, and which encourage citizens to become
involved in planning the future of their city.
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Appendix A
Downtown Area Plan Committee
FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY: NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
FOR
DEVELOPOMENT OF THE DOWNTOWN AREA PLAN
The City and County of Denver and The Denver Partnership, Inc.
are jointly embarking on a multi-year effort to produce a plan
for future public and private development in downtown Denver.
We will use a process for cooperative public/private planning
that is unique nationally: a true partnership of public and
private resources, rather than the mere support of one side
for the planning actions of the other.
Due to the uniqueness of this partnership, we have found it
helpful to clarify in advance certain elements of the process
and our respectiIve roles in it, for our mutual internal use
only.
o Status of the Plan. The Downtown Area Plan produced
in this joint effort will have the same status as
any plan produced entirely internallyby -e--CTty.
Therefore, the City will take a visible lead in the
process, such that the final product will become an
integral part of City policy.
o Governance of the process. The effort will be governed
by a broad-based policy c-mmittee composed of represen-
tatives of the executive and legislative branches
of the City, The Denver Partnership, and other major
stakeholders in downtown. The committee will be ap-
pointed by the Mayor based on the joint nominees of
the City and the Partnership.
o Preliminary decision-making process. Prior to the
convening of the policy committee, deEisions related
to the process will be made by consensus of the City
and the Partnership. These will include preliminary
decisions that are necessary in preparation for the
work of the policy committee, in such areas as design
of the process, identification of participants, scope
of the Plan, work program and time line. When the
policy committee is convened it will ratify or modify
the direction of those decisions.
o Staffing. The Plan will be staffed jointly by
the City and the Partnership. The staff of each organ-
ization will be supervised by its in-house staff di-
rector: the _ygnb4 Director for Downtown Planning,
for the City's Office of Planning and Development:
and the Director of Civic Design and Development for
The Denver Partnership.
Memorandum of Understanding
Page two
The staff directors will moderate policy committee
meetings and will jointly coordinate and allocate
staff resources on a routine basis in response
to the needs of the policy committee. To further
assure coordination, the staff directors will
meet regularly as a plan management team with
Bill Lamont and Dick Fleming. =44A A C1AaAd o. C-
In addition to its Deputy Director, the City
will contribute one full-time staff person to
the effort and additional staff expertise as
needed and available. The will also co-
orAinate the assistance of other City agencies
in the process.
The Partnership will commit the resources of
its Civic Design Team, including its staff,
director and consulting resources.
Th. 1 A .44 ar~ 0- .00 o 44 ;sWe will proceed wi t e Plan on e sis of this unde standing,
and will modify it by consensus as needs arise.
William Lamont, Directqr Richard C.D. FlemingPresident
Office of Planning & The Denver Partnership, Inc.
Development, City &
County of Denver
Date / Date I
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MEMORANDUM
TO: Stephanie Foote
Central Platte Valley Development Committee
FROM: Tom Gougeor1l 6
Chair, Downtown Area Plan Steering Committee
DATE: December 18 , 1984
SUBJECT: DOWNTOWN AREA PLAN STEERING COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
CENTRAL PLATTE VALLEY DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE
On December 13, 1984, the agenda of the Downtown Area Plan Steering Committee
meeting included an in-depth discussion of the current status of the proposed
plan for development of the Central Platte Valley. As a result of that
discussion, the Committee concluded by consensus that the Central Platte Valley
Plan as presently configured, is incompatible with the criteria for downtown
area development adopted by consensus of the Downtown Area Plan Steering
Committee, until the following issues are resolved:
- elimination of the barrier effect between downtown and the Valley;
and
- development of the Valley without a major shift of market absorption
from downtown to the Central Platte Valley.
In addition, the Committee expressed concern regarding the extent to which the
development plan improves or degrades downtown access, and the extent to which
the Central Platte Valley will provide housing and open space.
Until these issues are resolved, it is the belief of the Downtown Area Plan
Steering Committee that the Central Platte Valley Development Plan is not
compatible with the goals of the Downtown Area Plan. It is our hope that
you may be able to respond to these concerns as you proceed with your planning.
If we can be of assistance, we would be happy to meet with you to help resolve
these issues.
Our next Steering Committee meetings are scheduled for January 10th and 31st.
It would be most helpful if we could have a response to share with them at
one of these meetings.
cc: Downtown Area Plan Steering Committee
(9Gr
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DENVER'S DOWNTOWN AREA PLAN:
A UNIQUE JOINT VENTURE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS
The City and County of Denver and The Denver Partnership, Inc.
are jointly embarking on a multi -year effort to produce a plan
for future public and private development in Downtown Denver.
They will use a process for cooperative public/private planning
that is unique nationally: a _t_ partnerhip of city and bus-
iness community resources and interests, rather than the mere
support of one side for the planning actions of the other.
The result will be an agenda for public and private development
action in which both sectors have true ownership, and therefore
a higher commitment to implementation.
The Plan will be governed by a broad-based policy committee
appointed by the Mayor. It will include representatives of
the executive and legislative branches of the City, The Denver
Partnership and other major stakeholders in downtown.
The committee will be staffed jointly by the City's Office of
Planning and Development and the Partnership's Civic Design
an Development Team. It will draw on the technical resources
~o various agencies and public interest groups, and on periodic
consulting services made available through the Partnership's 4
(i funding.
The Plan grows out of the recognition by both the City and
The Denver Partnership, independently, of the rieed to:
o create a common vision for downtown among the citizens
o enver and the vate actors
in its development:
o guide decisions regarding development and operation
of downtown by public officials, developers, residents,
merchants and property owners:
o link the investments of the public and private sectors
to produce higher quality development and greater
citizen enjoyment of downtown.
These are goals which the City is pursuing in its other planning
efforts in Denver's neighborhoods. The Denver Partnership has
also been addressing the attention of the business community
to these needs in its planning, development and downtown manage-
ment activities since 1980. The Downtown Area Plan will merge
these efforts in the "neighborhood" that belongs to all the
people of Denver.
- Facilitators + stakeholders = consensus
By Al Knight
AfM NisU DO
mixed blessings, but none has been more mixed
T HE Pelia .dInsrto has produced manythan the introduction of the mellifluous, multi-talented facilitator. Members of this special
bh ed don't need to know much about the subject
matter at hand. They are specialists
in regulating "the process" - short-
hand for the municipal decision-mak-
Ing process. It matters little if the
subject begins with A or Z. The "pro-
cess" is the same.
Facilitators keep meetings and
task forces going. They make certain
everyone has a chance to speak. They
rkeep attention focused, and they fillKnight up the huge expanses of butcher pa-
per draped over every available inch of wall space. In
their tasks they use different colored inks for different
kinds of ideas. It has been said that a planning or
". onsensus building" facilitator is an ordinary Yuppie
in all respects, save for hands that have become
gi arled from holding all those highlight pens at the
s ne time.
Whatever their merits, they are with us, aiding and,
at ting whatever is happening at the Platte Valley
C, rnmittee ZITnd the Downtown Area Plan. They have
even shown up when the future of the Cherry Creek
Shopping Center or Civic Center Is considered.
One of the firms that makes a decent living facilitat-
ii-, is ACCORD Associates, a Boulder company, for-
m.rly Rocky Mountain Center on the Environment,
wI ich has had ties w'th both Bill Lamont, Denver's
pl nning director and John Parr, policy advisor, cam-
p; gn aide, and general organizational whiz for the
P, na administration.
rhe operative principle, as outlined by ACCORD VP
Si -an Carpenter, is really quite simple: Get all the
p; rties and interests ("stakeholders" in the jargon)
together, eschew adversarial discussions and build con-
sensus. One, two, three.
Take the Platte Valley Development as an example.
V ithout a task force. the old-fashioned process would
h ve required prospe< tive developers to put forward a
p in and an accomp; nying zoning request. Neighbor-
h od groups and afft eted interests would then have
b-en able to take p-tsbots and complain about the
d nsity, lack of open space and so on. The developers
% ould have had a chance to "give In" on some points or
put the proposal to a vote.
In the present scheme, this old-fashioned frictie is
'The process' lurks in minutes of the steering committee for a downtown plan.
supposed to disappear. Stakeholders, watched over by
facilitators, meet to discuss the issues. At the end,
presumably, everyone will be supportive of the result.
After all, it is a group effort. This is called "buy-in."
But wouldn't you know! Not everyone is happy.
One hint of trouble in planning paradise was the
recent resignation of Councilman Ted Hackworth from
the downtown group. He said the $100,000 or so being
spent on the project was a waste of money and he
wouldn't appropriate $10 if he had it to do again.
Another sign of trouble: In its heavy reliance on task
forces and facilitators, the Denver Planning Board,
lately an institutional oddity with uncertain duties, had
been bypassed and ignored.
Late last year, Don Etter, chairman of the Denver
Planning Board, resigned. He was a Pefla appointee,
well respected in the community and the author of
several books on local historical themes.
Injuries from an auto accident last summer played a
part in his decision to step down, but Etter wrote an
extraordinary letter to Pefta, asking questions that the
mayor still has not answered.
"Is there a role today for a visible, effective and
influential planning board?" Etter asked, "And, if so.
what is that role?" More pointedly, he wanted to know,
"What are you and the planning office going to do to
assure the visibility, effectiveness and influence of the
planning board?"
Etter went on to say that there is a growing concern
in the city that the administration's commitment to
planning "may be just window dressing."
Without a set of planning goals there is no way to tell
whether a given result is the product of planning, or
whether the planning process is simply a "thin veil
over outside forces" that the city doesn't control.
Etter's position on the board is still vacant. Dick
Deane, president of Deane Buick, has been asked to
consider serving on the board, but hasn't made up his
mind. "Don Etter has a lot of insight into thatsituation.
It is a lot of time to devote to something with such a
limited role in planning," Deane said. "I haven't made
a decision."
These are important rumblings around the municipal
clearing. All the more so because they remind us we
haven't yet seen a product produced by "the process.
Have we? e
I., '11teMWI 60"qTE...
Appendix B
Platte Valley Development Committee
MAYOR CITY AND COUNTY BUILDING - DENVER, COLORADO - 80202
AREA CODE 503 575-2721
FOR RELEASE February 8, 1984
The Mayor and City Planning and Development Director Bill Lamont
today announced the commencement of a comprehensive planning process-
for the Central Platte Valley. Lamont outlined a work program which
includes formation of a Central Platte Valley Development Committee
which will include representatives of the following groups:
Platte Valley Alliance of Neighbors
Mile High Land Associates
Trizec Properties
Platte Valley Landowners Association
Auraria Campus
Denver Union Terminal
The Denver Partnership
A local government policy committee consisting of three representa-
tives from the Denver City Council, two representatives from the Denver
Planning Board and one representative from the Mayor's Office will also
be part of the Platte Valley Development Committee. The Mayor indicated
that the representatives on the Policy Committee would include:
Councilman Sal Carpio
Councilwoman Cathy Reynolds
Councilwoman'Stephanie Foote
John Desmond ( Denver Planning Board)
Phil Milstein (Denver Planning Board)
Tom Gougeon (Mayor's -Office)
In addition to this committee structure, Lamont indicated that a number
of other groups would serve as resource people and technical advisers to the
process. This group includes the RTD, Colorado Highway Department,
ft
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Greenway Foundation, professional associations of architects, landscape
architects and planners, the Urban Design Forum, universities, city
agencies and others.
Lamont indicated that the goal of the process is to facilitiate
successful redevelopment of the Platte Valley in a cooperative fashion
Lamont distinguished this process from the previous Framework committee
approach in two ways. "In the previous process, city policymakers were
not directly involved and the city had not articulated any policy
positions. In this process, the city policymakers will be addressing
fundamental issues relating to the city's objectives in the redevelop-
ment effort. In addition, this process is designed to provide the context
within which both the city and private developers can make financial
commitments in the Platte Valley with some degree of certainty about the
area's future direction. The previous process did not provide that
context." The work program outlined by Lamont is expected to be completed
in 8 to 9 months. At that point, the city and developers would be prepared
to move into an implementation phase.
The Mayor called the successful redevelopment of the Platte Valley
"one of the highest priorities.of my administration" and a "tremendous
opportunity to positively influence the future of Denver's core area."
The Mayor also indicated that redevelopment of such a large parcel
of land in close proximity to the downtown area is an opportunity that is
virtually unique in the nation.
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2To reduce these risks, a Local Government -Policy Committee is being established
to become deeply involved with the Central Work Committee. This Work Committee
is being established as the Platte Valley Development Committee. The subcommittee
of public policy officials is charged with developing and representing the City's
position for input to the larger committee, while also participating on that
committee. The participants are as shown:
Platte Valley Development Committee (PVDC)
P.L.A.N (1)
Mile High Land Associates (1)
P.V.L.A. (1)
TRIZEC Properties (1)
Auraria (1)
Denver Partnership (1)
Local Government Policy
Committee (6)
D.U.T. (Railroads) (1)
I POLICY INPUT
Neighborhood Groups Other Public Agencies
Policy Committees Policy Committees
Local Government Policy
Committee (LGPC)
City Council (3)
Mayor's Rep. (1)
Planning Board (2)
TECHNICAL INPUT
Resource Groups/Technical
Advisors
R.T.D.
Urban Drainage & Fld.Control
District
State Highway Dept.
AIA/APA/ASLA/Urban Des.Forum
University groups
City agencies
Greenway Foundation
Etc.
The P.V.D.C. will initially meet to agree on the process and work program. It
is suggested that the point of departure, the work program as proposed on the
attached sheets will be reviewed and adopted, amended or replaced by the Platte
Valley Development Committee. All participants will need to be brought up-to-
date, however.
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CENTRAL PLATTE VALLEY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Introduction
Considerable analysis of the Central Platte Valley has already occurred. Besides
the public and private studies in the 60's and 70's, there more recently have
been two private planning efforts (Mile High and P.V.L'A..)and considerable neigh-
borhood review (P.L.A.N.). Some new development or rehabilitation has already
occurred within the Platte Valley, but not to an extent that would preclude the
preparation of a comprehensive development plan.
In addition to the recent private efforts, there are numerous public studies un-
derway of elements in, around and through the Valley (i.e., transportation, parking,
drainage, etc.). Some are nearing completion.
Quite rightly, transportation needs have already been identified as the single
most dominant issue and most costly public element that must be addressed. Access
and circulation improvements are the key to enabling private development in the
Valley and also essential to the further development of the downtown.
Because of the magnitude of potential public investment, creative financing concepts
and establishment of priorities are also critical to success. How the costs are
to be shared will be the subject of considerable public review. The form and
level of public investment of other citywide needs must be answered.
The plan, as it is developed, will be the beginning. It will require periodic
refinement and is interactive in nature. For example, the Goals and Policies as
they are established, will be subject to testing and revision as the process pro-
ceeds. What is workable and achievable will be kept; what is not will be amended
or dropped.
To have any chance of success, all available data and experience will have to be
utilized. It is not the intent of this current effort to re-invent the wheel.
But what has been missing, namely public policy positions, will very likely temper
many of the conclusions some participants may have already reached.
The program will provide a public forum to educate the community as to the sig-
nificance of the appropriate development of the Valley and to test alternatives.
Everyone in Denver has a stake in the success of the process. Hopefully, with
the direction established and concurrence with the plan, both public and private
investments can proceed wisely.
Public Policy
What had been missing from the previous effort of the Framework Committee was
guidance from the public policy makers. The Mayor, Council and Planning Board
were only peripherally involved, if at all. Great risks were being taken, that
the effort would have been successful when it came time for official public re-
view and decision making, particularly with respect to the financial decisions
ecessary to facilitate development.
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TO: Platte Valley Development Committee
FROM: DeAnne Butterfield, John Huyler and Kathy Butler
RE: July 21-22 Retreat
DATE: July 19, 1984
In developing the agenda for this weekend's retreat we are taking into account our
own observations about the Committee's work since February, our conversations with
Committee members, Lloyd Goff's memo to the Committee of June 20, Mile High's
agenda suggestions of July 12 and discussions with the Planning Office. We are working
from the assumptions that you agreed to last Thursday, specifically:
- that you want to get specific and make decisions
- that you want to roll up your sleeves and disagree with each other in a
productive way
- that you don't want to make more lists
- that you want the retreat to launch the rest of the Committee's work
- that by the end of the retreat, you want to have agreed upon a concept for
the entire Valley and produced the draft decisions about specific building blocks
(transportation, flood plain, etc.).
The attached draft agenda for Saturday morning includes a presentation, with Committee
discussion, of a city "strawman" by Ron Straka and Will Fleissig of the DPO. This
presentation draws on their analysis of design, finance, institutional mechanisms and
phasing, a look at citywide needs, plus an assessment of all the development proposals
presented to date. It is based on the Goals and Evaluation Criteria contained in "The
Progress Report." It will offer their ideas for a Valley-wide design and development
framework.
Recognizing the value of moving discussions ahead by bridging back and forth between
broad concepts and specific building blocks, a 3j hour work session is scheduled Saturday
afternoon. At this time, the Committee will discuss, analyze, react to, and critique
the assumptions behind specific proposals as well as broad concepts for the role and
image of the Valley.
Sunday morning will be devoted to capturing the items of agreement and disagreement.
On Sunday afternoon we will pin down details for next steps such as a press release,
appointment of any subcommittees and a continuing workplan for the committee, the
staff and any additional outside consultants that may need to be hired.
In formulating this agenda we are aware of numerous frustrations shared by many of
you. This retreat is the opportunity for you to move ahead together.
We look forward to the weekend.
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PLATTE VALLEY DEVELOPMENT CMMITTEE
Ground Rules
1) The Platte Valley Development Carnittee (PVDC) is composed of
representatives of various groups which participate at the invitation of
the Mayor of Denver. It is the responsibility of the groups to identify
their principal and alternate representatives and to notify the Carnittee
of any changes. Because the success of the PVDC will ultimately depend
upon personal relationships and trust, only designated representatives may
serve on the Conmittee.
2) The members of the PVDC agree to participate in this cooperative
effort believing this forum offers the best possibility for building
consensus on a Plan for the Central Platte Valley. In this spirit, we
will each make a good faith attempt to bring issues to the Comrittee and
will try to resolve them collaboratively before taking them to other
forums.
3) Consistent with the charge from the Mayor, the PVDC is responsible for
its own process, timeline and product.
4) Except during times when public comment is solicited by the Committee,
only Committee members or people who have been asked to make presentations
may participate in Camiittee discussions.
5) In order to avoid "surprises," participants will advise the Cnmittee
of actions or decisions of their organizations that are within the scope
of Cammittee discussions. It is the intention of this ground rule that
financial or policy comitments within the Central Platte Valley that
night affect other Committee members or influence the issues and policies
under discussion by the Comittee will be disclosed while still pending.
6) Unless explicitly stated otherwise, gtatements made by individual
members of the Committee will not be interprertdas bdi t.-eir
organizations.
7) It is the policy of the PVDC tc infoim the concmanity about its ongoing
work and to encourage and actively solicit ideas and reactions from all
Denver citizens. A variety of specific opportunities for community
interaction with all aspects of the Comittee's work will be offered
during the process. To the extent possible the meetings of the PVDC will
be open to the public. The Conittee acknowledges the possibility that it
may need to meet in private for particular discussions. In such an event
the Comittee will issue a public statement following the meeting.
8) It is the mutual responsibility of PVDC menbers to assure that these
ground rules are observed. Participants are free to question, in good
faith, actions of others which may come within the scope of these ground
rules.
February 23, 1984
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Relocation of
rail yards at Union
Station Is a goal
of Platte Valley
Development
Committee. Where
to put them is
one issue dividing
members. An-
other Is how Den-
ver and private
developers will
split the $125
million cost of
public Improve-
ments that the
massive project
will require.
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Platte developers
hint at withdrawal
!Relocation of mainine'tracks is one Issue holding up the $I bil-'. ,lion plan to redevelop South Platte.Valley west of downtown.
By SUZANNE WEISS
Rocky Mountain Nr".staff write
copyrigMt 1554. Denver PUbft* Co.
Problem that killed the redevelopment of
Denver's central Platte Valley near downtown
seven years ago are threatening to derail a new
plan for a $1 billion mixed-use complex on the
500-acre site.
The Platte Valley Development Committee,
appointed in March by Mayor Federico Pefna,
was supposed to negotiate transforming the run-
down industrial district into offices, shops,
parks and condominiums. Last week, it
scrapped its Dec. 7 deadline for issuing a final
report.Conflicts on the 14-member committee have
become so sharp that Denver planning director
William Lamont has begun meeting privately
with developers to try to work out a series of
compromises.
Instead of issuing its report Dec. 7. the com-
mittee dejectedly agreed to spend that day in
yet another work session - a move that had
impatient developers hinting of a pullout.
"We're already a year behind schedule. How
much longer can we be expected to stay in this
thing without seeing some light at the end of the
tunnel?" griped Peter Neukirch, chief negotia-
tor for the partnership of railroad and real-
estate interests seeking soning permits for the
redevelopment-
"i we can't get a plan that's acceptable be-
tween now and January. nothing's going to hap-
pen down there."
Major unresolved isue facing Pena's com-
mittee are the same ones that killed a proposed
redevelopment in 1977. They include:
0 How the city and private developers will
split the estimated $125 million in public im-
pmoveinets the massive, project will require.
The Pet administration favors using urban
renewal-type subsidies. issuing city bonds
backed by tax revenues the project will gener-
ate. A similar proposal was considered by the
previous city administration, but never went
anywhere.
S Where the railroads that have lucrative
freight operations and land holdings in the river
valley will agree to relocate their mainline
tracks. Moving the tracks across the river would
enhance the development potential of the east
bank of the Platte, railroad officials say. Bet
nearby neighborhoods and smaller developers in
the valley oppose the plan.
Added to those items are these new questions-
How many housing units and how much open
s will the city require developers to 
in-
c ude?
Neighborhood groups want 140 acres set aside
for parks and open space. Developers have
pledged only 30 acres for parks.
And Lamont's office wants 4,000 housing units
included in the project, but developers say it
doesn't make economic sense to build more than
1,000.
In the committee's first nine months, it has
settled a lot of minor issues between developers
and other interested parties: downtown retail-
ers, city planners, neighborhood groups, small
landowners in the valley and the Auraria Higher
Education Center.
Now the committee is down to what one
member described as "the brute-force confron-
tations."
"In the style Lamont is using, you resolve as
many of the issues as you can through analysis,
by letting the facts speak for themselves," mid
Tom Ragonetti, a lawyer representing a devel-
oper who holds 20 acres in the valley. "What's
left after that are the issues where someone
win and someone loses."
At stake is a project that by most accounts
would change the face of the city and he'
revitalize its economy
ePA*. *lge
Platte: Relocation
of track a problem
Continued from page 6
The river valley, 10 miles long
and a mile wide through the heart
of Denver, has long been the city's
back alley. Nowhere is it more of
an eyesore than along the stretch
that divides downtown from the
northwest neighborhoods an ex-
panse of abandoned warehouses,
rubble-strewn lots and junkyards
crisscrossed by railroad tracks and
aging viaducts.
Studies dating to the early 1960s
have concluded that redevelop-
ment of the central part of the
-,valley could create a major new
economic base for Denver.
By the time city officials got
around to taking a hard look at
redevelopment in the early 1970s,
however, federal funding for such
projects had mostly dried up. So it
turned to the railroad that owns
most of the land there - Burling-
ton Northern - to bankroll the
project.
Burlington Northern wound up
being a temperamental partner in
the earlier venture. The railroad's
"take-it-or-leave-it" attitude an-
gered neighborhood groups con-
cerned about traffic, noise and pol-
lution from the high-density
project.
But Burlington Northern is in-
volved in the latest proposal. Its
land-development subsidiary, Gla-
cier Park Co., is teamed with Den-
ver businessmen Marvin Davis and
Myron "hNcky" Miller.
- About three-fourths of the land
the partnership controls already is
noned to atow office, retail and
light-industrial development. The-
rest will have to be resoned for.
hotels and residential units.
Developers say they have spent
more than $1 million on planning
and engineering studies. .
The studies and negotiatioas
have not resolved the question of
relocating tracks which carry
about 20 trains a day through the
valley. David Cole, representing
north and west Denver neighbor-
hood groups on the committee,
says the tracks will be moved to
the river's west bank "over our
dead bodies."
Neukirch said last week that the
developers aren't necessarily set
on moving the mainline tracks
across the river, but think it makes
sense to consolidate highways and
rail lines in a single corridor.
Lamont's staff appears to favor
the idea and, over Cole's objec-
tions, has undertaken more de-
tailed studies of the west-bank rail
alignment.
That item will top the commit-
tee's agenda Dec. 7.
Also at the top of the list will be
the question of who will pay for
streets, sewers, sidewalks, utili-
ties, rebuilt highway interchanges,
river rechanneling and other pub-
lic improvements.
Burlington Northern's earlier
deal collapsed when the railroad
couldn't agree with city officials
on how to finance an estimated $90
million in public improvements.
The price tag is up to $125 mil-
lion now, figures given to the com-
mittee by city Finance Director
Jim Murray indicate.
How much of the cost the city
would bear isn't known.'Lamont
and his staff are holding that out
as a negotiating point.
Murray's figures, however, indi-
cate the city has devised a com-
plex scheme for splitting the cost
of public improvements with the
developers.
The plan relies heavily on tax-
increment financing, a technique
that would pay off public-improve-
ment bonds issued by the city with
the new sales- and property-tax
revenues generated by the Platte
Valley development.
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Platte Valley development
tied to convention center
By Joanne Ditmer
Denver Post Business Writer
When anyone talks about downtown
housing, the focus invariably turns to the
Central Platte Valley, a spiderweb of rail-
road tracks that is the largest parcel of
land that' might be redeveloped close to
downtown.
Whether it will be developed could de-
pend in part as to where Denver's pro-
posed new convention center may be lo-
cated, suggested Peter H. Neukirch, sen-
ior vice president of Miller-Klutznick-
Davis-Gray Co., largest potential
landowner with an option to buy 155 acres
with Burlington Northern Inc. It is rough-
ly half the land to be redeveloped.
Locating Denver's proposed new con-
vention center next to Union Station could
give a five-year head start on the rede-
velopment of the Central Platte Valley.
Putting it elsewhere could markedly delay
the redevelopment, he said firmly.
"I can't say yes or no if we will drop our
option if the convention center doesn't go
at Denver Union Terminal," Neukirch
said carefully. "We've had no discussion
that would say if the convention center is
not built there that we'd pull out.
"But the convention center would be a
tremendous catalyst to change and im-
prove the image of the valley. We need
some big first-rate project to get it start-
ed." He studied a map of the area for a
moment before adding, "If we do drop our
option, I'd guess the railroad yards would
remain there the next 20 years."
The -.company's multi-billion dollar
mixed-use development plan is for the val-
ley between the South Platte River and
Cherry Creek, behind and primarily south
of the depot. October 10 Neukirch and
many other observers of the urban scene
were astonished when outside consultants
judged a Golden Triangle location, south
of Civic Center, as tops among six poten-
tial sites, followed by two Union Station
proposals.
"The convention center location is one
of the decision-makers, but not the only
one as to if we develop the Platte Valley,"
Neukirch declared. He added that ques-
tions that were not asked and should be
regarding the site selection include:
"Where will the convention center help
the city the most in the long term?
"If the city is truly interested in devel-
oping the Central Platte Valley, then that
has to be a factor in picking the conven-
tion center site."
"And if we want to get rid of those eye-
sore tracks, the center-should go to Union
Station."
Given his "druthers" the new complex
would be located parallel behind Union
Station and up against 16th Street, on land
that is partly optioned by his company and
the remainder owned by Denver Union
Terminal. Without the convention center
there, the valley infrastructure for the
city and developers is much more expen-
sive.
He noted that Burlington Northern has
similar properties - railroad yards next
to downtown - all across the United
States, and other cities have been urging
the railroad company to come to their cit-
ies and redevelop those properties. B-N
has been attempting to redevelop its Den-
ver property for a decade.
"I'm afraid they'll decide to go else-
where and drop Denver - the other cities
would be smaller projects, so less expen-
sive to do, and the cities are asking them
to come, so it would be easier."
The Mile High Land Project, as the
company has dubbed its project, is rough-
ly half the Central Platte Valley to be
.redeveloped, and. curves along the south
side of the river. Tentative plans would be
a mix of office and residential, with a
build-out of 20 years, "depending on the
Please see PLATTE on 10-H
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1Platte Valley
housing plans
'touch and go'
PLATTE from 1-H
market and real estate cycles in the core
city and suburbs." Planning consultant for
the project is RTKL of Baltimore, which.
did the much-lauded Rouse Company Har-
borplace in Baltimore.
"It's very touch and go on residenti if
we can get the density we want on offices,
then we can afford residential," Neukirch
acknowledged. The housing is important
because "it medns you can complete the
valley sooner; the interest on the com-
plete infrastructure can kill you if it
stretches out too long."
It would be "affordable housing, not
luxury, for the young professionals", 800
to 1,000 units at approximately 1,000
square feet per unit. The housing would be
to the southern part of the property,
across the river from the Mile High Stadi-
um and the Children's Museum, and per-
haps set back along the length of the South
Platte, facing the Greenway trail.
"Market studies show the public has a
terrible perception of the valley, and we'll
have to improve that if housing is to
work," he commented. The company
plans to do extensive landscaping and
maximize the river's assets to counter
that perception. There will be an "active"
park near the apartments, "passive park"
along the waterway and a "festival park"
near the remnants of the historic railroad
turntable and roundhouse. "The round-
house would be a good place for a
farmer's market," he said enthusiastical-
ly.
He listened thoughtfully when told that
a group of railroad buffs would love to re-.
store both turntable and roundhouse as a
railroad park right across from the Chil-
dren's Museum. Such a park - complete
with railroad engines the buffs own -
could be a unique addition to the complex,
be agreed.
Because the proposed development is in
part on a 100-year-flood-plain, it would be
necessary to deepen and broaden the
South Platte, probably adding trails along
the river in a terraced setback. Fill would
have to be added - two feet at the north
end by Cherry Creek, eight feet at the
south - to the development area. "We're
willing to help pay for our part, but will
the city and flood control district have the
funds at the same time?"
Where the property crosses Cherry
Creek, Neukirch envisions a River Walk in
the spirit of San Antonio's fabled attrac-
tion, with shops and restaurants linked by
a promenade along the river. It would at-
tract residents of the valley and downtown
workers as well as tourists. "It's our last
change to do this near downtown Den-
ver," he said soberly.
Total development would be about 11
million square feet, with eight millon of
that offices, and the remainder housing,
support retail and entertainment. The of-
fices would be primarily away from thd
river, from Speer Boulevard south to Fifth
Street. From the residential area north
most of the buildings would be eight sto-
ries tall, with an occasional 25-story build-
ing "for punctuation." North of Cherry
Creek they would reflect lower downtown
with primarily 16- to 17-story buildings.
The heights and density - indeed the
plan itself - have been discussed at great
length with representatives of surrounding
- neighborhoods. "We've been talking to
them for 18 to 20 months, and have paid
considerable attention to their thoughts,"
Neukirch said. That has resulted in a pro-
spective height of 200 feet for buildings in
the south, with "point towers" at strategic
spots for emphasis.
"We don't want to compete with down-
town - think we'd lose. But we'd like to
give tenants a third choice between the
density of downtown and the Denver Tech
Center office park concept - a little more
open space, but right next to downtown
and easy access to the freeway. We want
to do something very significant with the
property. Miller-Klutznick-Davis-Gray is
still sticking with Denver."
He said that there had been traffic stud-
ies to the year 2000, with and without
Platte Valley development, and that it
showed there would be a very small in-
crease with such development. "After all,
downtown Denver could add 50 million
square feet with no zoning changes right
now."
A poll of national brokers on how they
1 feel about Denver brought some interest-
ing findings, he said. "There are some
new companies who would like to come
here, but are hesitant. There's an oversup-.
p of office space, they wonder where
enver is going. Is there the excitement
of the Great City - what is our course,
where are we going? Everything seems to
be in the planning, not the doing stage"
It's clear Neukirch believes that the
convention center behind the union termi-
nal would be a start to making some of
those plans a reality.
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Platte Valley:
the Mayoral Committees
By Charlie Jordan
Planning, it is said, is the art of predicting the
unknowable, persuading the recalcitrant, and im-
plementing the improbable.
Planners may forget the difficulty of their task
at times when they are caught up in the idealistic
zeal of open people-oriented spaces and breath-
taking urban design. But mayors seldom forget.
Their response to controversial planning problems
is to appoint committees. By 1985, the Central
Platte Valley has been thoroughly committeed.
Tom Currigan was one mayor who overlooked
the rule. He produced a plan without a committee
in 1966 in response to the devastating flood of the
previous year. The mayor thought that he would
not need a committee; his plan depended upon
federal urban renewal money rather than a
specific consensus of private developers. In the
final analysis, his plan was never implemented
chiefly because the federal funds could not be
leveraged without the support of private devel-
opers who were interested in specific projects.
The administration of Mayor William
McNichols knew how to use committees. Starting
with the premise that the most important factor
determining the future of the Platte Valley was an
able and willing developer, Mayor McNichols
relegated committees to specific defined tasks that
kept them out of the hair of the private sector.
While he might encourage creativity and free-
thinking on a committee charged to rehabilitate
the South Platte River, any committee appointed
to work with area development interests was very
tightly controlled, consisting primarily of
representatives of the Administration and the
developers.
When the Burlington-Northern railroad teamed
with Del Webb to make a serious development bid
in the early 70s, McNichols appointed the Burling-
ton Northern Development Committee. The name
of the group, as well as its insider composition,
left no doubt of the mayor's intent as to its final
result. The committee's role, as defined by the
mayor, was never to plan the property, but rather
to integrate Burlington-Northern's plans with the
needs and capabilities of the city.
The eventual failure of the Burlington Northern
bid may have been partially due to the lack of in-
dependent "grassroots" representation on the
Development Committee itself. (Opposition
groups were represented on sub-committees but
only as minorities.) Inflexibility developed
because concerns from the adjoining neighbor-
hoods and other citizen groups could not be
discussed easily across a common table.
Mayor McNichols later corrected that over-
sight. When development plans began to surface
from some of the Central Platte's smaller land-
holders as the decade of the '80s began, the Mayor
appointed a Framework Committee that looked
more like a debating society than the collegial
Burlington Northern Development Committee
had been.
The Framework Committee was composed of
administration representatives, developers, mem-
bers of the Platte Valley Alliance of Neighbors
(PLAN), as well as other interest groups. Coun-
cilman Sal Carpio, whose district included the
Platte Valley, was appointed as well.
Finally, a committee had been formed with all
the right ingredients. The only aspect of the
package missing were the large landowners. The
developers who seemed ready to move controlled
less than five percent of the Central Platte land.
The Framework Committee was doomed by the
lack of proposals.
With the entry of the Pena administration, the
game started over for another round. But within
six months of taking office, the new mayor had
taken his first step toward development of the
Central Platte - formation of a committee.
The Platte Valley Development Committee held
its first meeting on February 1, 1984. Newly seated
councilwoman Stephanie Foote was selected to
chair the group composed of a wide variety of in-
terest groups and was left to raise foundation
funds to provide the effort with adequate staffing.
Those represented included several development
interests, downtown civic organizations, the city's
Planning Board, the Administration, Auraria,
and the railroads. Historic preservation interests
remained on the sidelines to watch.
This time around seemed to be the charm. The
committee moved forward effectively and the ma-
jor landowners joined in with serious commit-
ments toward development. The economy had
turned up sufficiently to allow early development
to return to the realm of reality.
The Platte Valley Development Committee had
no intentions of creating a specific site plan for the
developers. Neither were they willing to merely in-
terface city concerns with the plans of the land-
owners. Instead, they proceeded to work cooper-
atively with the advice of developers and others to
fit the debris-ridden rail yards into the city's com-
prehensive plan.
Despite the clarity of its approach and the diver-
sity of its participants, the success of the commit-
tee was by no means assured. Each of the partici-
pants on the group brought specific concerns to
the table.
"I have one criticism of the selection," admit-
ted Chairwoman Foote. "There are too many
special interest people on the committee. Some, I
think, don't want to have anything developed in
the Valley at all."
While the work of the committee remains one
month away from its expected completion, it has
already accomplished milestones in coordination
and agreement. At this point, every indication
points to a strong consensus report being issued
that will define the necessary development para-
meters for the Valley that will give developers the
assurances they need to proceed with investment.
If it can succeed in its quest to provide a polic%
and financial framework for transforming the
Central Platte sow's ear into Denver's silk purse,
it may well be the Valley's final committee.
Tour of Saloons Offered
SALOONS OF DENVER TOURS
Dip into Denver's past with these springtime tours
of historic neighborhoods. They're scheduled at
cocktail time in notable local taverns, and they
feature a walking tour of history-heavy streets to
vintage restaurants. CU-Denver Associate Profes-
sor of history Tom Noel, the author-barfly-histor-
ian, will share with you the folklore and history of
these legendary inner city beats:
May 2 - LARIMER STREET. Convene under-
ground at La Mancha Restaurant, rear of
1430 Larimer Square, for introductory liba-
tions, followed by a twilight, stroll along
Denver's most famous street, a one-time
main street become skid row that is now the
barometer of the inner city renaissance. Dine
afterwards at an ancient cantina, La Casa de
Manuel.
May 9 - NORTH DENVER. Meet at Carbone
Restaurant, 3609 Tejon Street, for an in-
troduction to Denver's most colorful ethnic
neighborhood. After a walking tour of this
landmark studded area, sup in the Ig80's St.
Patrick's Catholic Church.
May 16 - GLOBEVILLE. Congregate at the
Slovenian Home, 4464 Washington Street,
to hear longtime saloonkeeper John
Popovich's tale of this immigrant-industrial
neighborhood. After a walking tour of this
old gold and silver smelting town, celebrate
dinner at the Globeville Inn.
3 Thursdays, 6 to approximately 9 PM, May I to
15
Fee: . $36 (food and drinks NOT included)
556-2735
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Peha drums up support for station site
By SUZANNE WEISSRocky Mountan mews Staff writer
Redevelopment of the railyards flanking lower down-
town will revive Denver's economic base, Mayor Feder-
ico Pea said Tuesday. and building a $100 million
convention center at Union Station "is the spark to get
it going."
The city has been trying for two decades to open up
the river valley in which the rallyards lie, Pena said,
"and we're going to get it done under this administra-
tion."
The mayor held afternoon meetings with the editorial
boards of both Denver daily newspapers to drum up
support for the City Council's designation Monday of
Union Station as the site for a new convention center.
The council voted 7-5, with one abstention, for Union
Station to be the site of a complex that will ultimately
be six times the size of Currigan Hall and has the
potential to make Denver a big-league convention city.
Meanwhile, the downtown business community.
which has been split for nearly a year over the conven-
tion center issue, began to close ranks behind the Union
Station site.
"We believe the important thing now is to reconcile
any differences of opinion we may have had in the past
and to get on with this important project without
further delay," said Chamber of Commerce president
Rex Jennings in a statement issued Tuesday afternoon.
The chamber's board of directors two weeks ago
voted to endorse the expansion of Currigan Hall. rather
than construction of a new facility.
The mayor told News editors that his administration
has drawn up a plan to finance the convention center
project with revenue bonds that would be paid off
primarily through a 3 percent increase in the city's
hotel-room tax.
The bond issue won't be submitted to the voters, the
mayor said, because it involves specially earmarked
revenues rather general tax money.
Pela was clearly pleased about the council's vote
Monday, but acknowledged that the battle isn't over.
"Now the real hard work begins," he said.
Members of the council want strict conditions built
into any agreement with developers of the land near
Union Station. Among those conditions will be city
approval of any site on which a convention hotel is
built.
. Some members of the council also have criticized
Peas's proposed financing scheme, saying it relies too
heavily on borrowed money.
The next step is for the council to approve a resolu-
ROCKY MOUATeAIN sews sTaPP P"070 By PeAKS KIMMGL
Mayor Federico Pena listens as Denver Planning Director Bill Lamont, left, explains to News
editors how railroad tracks will be moved to make way for convention center at Union Station.
tion opening negotiations with the railroad subsidiary
that owns the 31-acre site near Union Station on which
the convention facilities would be built. 
The resolution is expected to be up for a preliminary
vote of the council on Jan. 28. A public hearing and a
final vote would be held the following Monday.
Councilman Paul Swalm, who was a key vote on the
Union Station site, said Tuesday that other members of
the council who favored alternate sites seem to be most
concerned about the link Pens has made between the
convention center and the proposed railyards redevel-
opment.
Billionaire oilman Marvin Davis, attorney-developer
Myron "Micky" Miller and a partnership of railroad
interests are planning a $2 billion development contain-
ing up to 20 million square feet of offices, apartments.
shops and warehouses.
"That's what has got people all goosey," Swalm said.
"They seem to think putting the convention center at
Union Station is just a wedge to get the city committed
to all these millions of dollars in costs. But I'm intend-
ing to keep an awful close eye on those costs."
Pens said he thinks some council members' fears
about the possibility of hidden costs are based on lack of
knowledge.
He said a recent briefing on the railyard-redevelop-
ment plans was attended by only two members of the
council.
"No wonder they don't know what's going on." be
said. "They don't go to these meetings."
Peh~a's aides see bright future-for Currigan Hall
By KEVIN FLYN14
Rocky Mountain News Stan Wrnt
Pena administration officials said Tuesday the area
around Currigan Hall has a bright future, despite the
fears of some downtown real estate experts who say it
could become a wasteland once the city pulls out its
convention center.
As the fallout began to settle from Monday's decision
to relocate Denver's convention complex to the rai-
lyards behind Union Station, the development company
that unsuccessfully proposed expanding Currigan Hall
said it will be in the parking lot business for some time
to come..
And a real estate executive who was allied with the
company maid values will continue to be depressed, and
development put off, in what is called the "Silver
Triangle" as a result of the move.
But William Lamont, Denver's planning director,
Tuesday said Currigan Hall brought no remarkable
spinoff development in the 17 years it has been in
operation at'14th and Stout streets. And several ideas
for recycling the. 100,000-square-foot-plus building.. he
maid, have the potential* to bring more people to that
neighborhood than the convention business ever did.
The city's decision won't have as drastic an impact in
the third site under consideration, experts said. That
was the Golden Triangle, the areas south of West Colfax
Avenue between Broadway and Speer Boulevard.
The Golden Triangle was a late entry into the conven-
tion center sweepstakes, entered only after being invit-
ed to do so by the city. The large landowners there had
been planning eventually to develop a mixed-use pro-
ject containing mostly office space and some residen-
tial units.
They will simply revert to that waiting game, accord-
ing to one of the developers.
Mayor Federico Penls and his aides started Tuesday
to give their Union Station bandwagon a shove, calting
for opponents to drop their arms and join them. But
there still were some pockets of resistance among
Currigan Hall backers.
"There may be a bigger boom in the Silver Triangle
as a result of the re-use of Currigan Hall." contended
Lamont. He said the city has received inquiries from
two parties who want to use the hall as a merchandise
mart for recreational equipment and fashion, and as a
media center and studio facility.
Another possibility, although remote, is to remodel
the building as a city office.
But Currigan Hall backers, dejected by the 7-5 loss in
the City Council a day earlier, noted that while Curri-
gan may not have brought much spinoff development
over the years, removing it will make a bad situation
worse.
Neil Macey, a broker who was active in the pro-
Currigan camp, said only one property has been put
under contract and sold in the Silver Triangle between
Stout Street, 14th Street. Speer Boulevard and Colfax
Avenue in the past two years.
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Platte Valley prognosis
HUGH GARDNER
When the history books of the future are written,
January 14, 1985 will be remembered as the day Denver
turned a very important corner in its quest for world-
class greatness.
For years now, the city has been mired in studious in-
decision about its long-term direction. With City Coun-
cil's decision last Monday to locate a new convention
center at Union Station, however, Denver's leadership
has propelled us into a new era of Inner-city revitaliza-
tion where we need it most ... the Platte River Valley,
Denver's blighted birthplace and heartland, key to the
city's growth and prosperity in the decades ahead.
Although the decision was justified primarily in terms
of projected costs to the city-the Union Station site
proved dramatically cheaper, especially with debt ser-
vice figured in-an equally fundamental theme in the
convention center debate was the Platte Valley's impor-
tance to Denver's future. As the controversy wore on. it
became increasingly clear that the decision should not
be made in a vacuum, in terms of costs alone, but also in
terms of where the economic stimulus it represents
should be targeted. Any of the sites were workable, but
where would the city get the biggest bang for ita bucks?
GUESTG """"""4' ..d
Two distinctly different philosophies emerged on this
point. The first, which prevailed throughout most of the
discussion, favored stimulating (or protecting) the
downtown CBD as It now exists by choosing the Curri-
gan or Golden Triangle sites. The second, which won the
day at virtually the last minute after some of the most
intense lobbying in memory, was the view that choosing
the Union Station site would stimulate redevelopment in
the Platte Valley, ultimately returning far greater bene-
fits to the city. Given the powerful constituencies in-
volved, the decision was a triumph of uncharacteristic
far-sightedness for City Council as well as the Mayor.
As a result, we will now have our new convention cen-
ter where it can be built most cheaply and quickly, with
minimal negative impacts on surrounding neighbor-
hoods and traffic. It's the aesthetically correct decision
as well-on the edge of downtown where such massive,
warehouse-like structures belong. The decision will also
invigorate Lower Downtown, boost the prospects of
Union Station being .reborn as a commuter rail hub and
expedite new roadway and mall improvements that the
valley needs anyway for improved access to downtown.
Most important, though, is the catalytic effect this deci.
gion will have on Platte Valley redevelopment.
It's true that the decision will make billionaires Mar-
vin Davis and Phillip Anschutz still more money, which
some civic activists seem to resent ... as if it could hap-
pen any other way. But despite the misimpressions fos-
tered by the daily newspapers, Platte Valley redevelop-
ment does not simply equate with the Miller-Davis Mile
High Land Project. With projected investments of $1.8
billion to redevelop 155 acres, this project is clearly of
great magnitude and pivotal importance to the valley's
future. But the full scope of redevelopment expected in
the valley is four times this size, both in acreage and in-
vestments. Using the 650 acres studied by the city plan-
ning office in developing its concept plan, a leading in-
ternational accounting firm has estimated that private
investments in the valley could approach 37 billion over
the next 30 years.
By choosing the Union Station site, in other words,
the city will thereby stimulate an influx of private in-
vestment dollars in to the Denver economy so enormous
as to dwarf the spin-off potential of the Curtigan and
Golden Triangle sites put together. And the bottom line
for the city's future fiscal health is that we must have
the new tax revenues that infill development in the
Platte Valley will bring us.
The Union Station decision will prove to be the grain
of sand that seeds the pearl of immeasurably greater
value. So what if Marvin Davis makes more money? So
will the city, which is fast approaching dire straits in the
revenue department. And so will Denver's taxpayers,
by reduced pressure for property and sales tax increas-
es. Revitalization on this scale is seldom achieved with-
out civic-conscious leadership from the private sector;
Dallas has its Trammel Crowe, Ft. Worth its Bass Broth-
ers, and perhaps we should be grateful that Denver has'
its Marvin Davis (and now Phil Anschutz as well).
The cycle of redevelopment in the valley will now be-
gin to yield its benefits significantly earlier than it could
otherwise. National attention will focus on the valley
and show -Denver on the move there; new investments
will flow in sooner, new city revenues will begin coming
in more quickly and public indebtedness for the city's
share of redevelopment costs can be retired faster with
lower net interest payments. Best of all, we will all soon
er enjoy Great City pride in our town, a feeling that car
never be authentic or complete until Denver's inner-city
heartlands are reclaimed.
It was clear from witnessing the City Council vote las
Monday that several councilpersons voting against th
Union Station site were paying back key constituencies
knowing that the Union Station site would win anywa)
Consensus on the choice is actually much higher tha
the closely-split vote seemed to indicate.
The city's task now is to work through the remainir
loose ends and make this consensus explicit, rallyir
behind it as so many business and civic organizatior
already have, hopefully making it unanimous. This kir
of clear citywide commitment to greatness is what w
get us there.
Hugh Gardner is a Denver-based media and politic
consultant with a particular interest in downto
development.
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APPENDIX C: COMMENTS OF DAVID STRAUS
David Straus, facilitator for the DAPC, reviewed this
thesis before submission. Straus had three main objections
to the paper.
First, Straus believes that the phrase "mediated
negotiation" is inappropriate to describe the DAPC process.
He does not feel that the DAPC was a "negotiation", and does
not see himself as a mediator. He thus disagrees with the
conclusions about mediated negotiation which this thesis
reaches. He describes the DAPC process as collaborative
problem solving, and believes that facilitators in
collaborative problem solving processes should take very
different roles that mediators in mediated negotiations.
Second, Straus does not believe that the thesis
adequately explains the time frame in which the conclusions
were reached. He commented that many of the feelings of DAPC
committee members have changed since this thesis was
concluded.
Third, Straus believes that this thesis presents a
biased description of the DAPC since it is not based on
interviews with all the committee members. He also believes
that the comments in Section 3 should be more clearly
identified with specific interviewees.
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